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1Summary
The dissertation examines corporate performance and capital structure of family firms, 
contributing to the limited empirical research on family firms. Family firms are prevalent in 
national economies all over the world.  It is the prevalence that makes family firms receive 
increasing attentions from academia. The dissertation consists of an introduction and three 
chapters. Each chapter is an independent paper. The first chapter is a joint work with Professor 
Morten Bennedsen and Dr. Markus Ampenberger. The version of in the dissertation will be 
published as Chapter 6 in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurial Finance by 
Oxford University Press. The second paper and third paper are single-authored papers.
      In the first chapter, we discuss the capital structure of family firms, with a focus on the debt-
equity mix. Two parts comprise the chapter. In the first part, we provide a literature review on 
existing theoretical and empirical research in the capital structure of family firms. The literature 
review shows that the most important theories to explain capital structure in family firms seem to 
be risk aversion, agency theory, and control considerations. We argue that risk aversion and 
control considerations have opposing impacts on the optimal choice of debt leverage of family 
firms. On one hand, controlling families of family firms are typically non-diversified investors 
with most of their wealth and human capital tied to the company and consequently family firms 
use less debt. On the other hand, controlling families want to maintain the control over their 
companies. This control consideration restricts the willingness to raise new equity outside the 
family and therefore often lead to a stronger dependence on banks and other debt instruments. 
The literature review also shows that evidence on capital structure choices of family firms is 
inconclusive. Large-scale evidence on private family firms is almost missing.  
2      In the second part of the chapter, we provide an empirical analysis of the leverage of family 
firms in Denmark, using an informative dataset covering around 200,000 private and public 
Danish firms. We find that family firms are less leveraged than non-family firms, regardless of 
which type of family firms. Over the past ten years, there has been a significant decline in the 
leverage of all firms, both family and non-family firms in Denmark. While small firms have the 
lowest leverage, entrepreneurial firms have the highest. We conclude that the unique 
characteristics of family firms, such as risk aversion and control considerations, rather than 
differences in other firm-specific characteristics are responsible for the lower levels of leverage 
on average in family firms.  
       Building on the findings of the first chapter, the second chapter examines whether family 
firms, with lower leverage, are better performers during the current global financial crisis. I 
construct a dataset covering firms from S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), 
CAC 40 (France), and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) during the period of 2006-2010. I find that broadly 
defined family firms do not outperform non-family firms during the crisis. However, family 
firms with founder presence (as CEO, a board member or a significant owner) outperform non-
family firms in Operating Return on Assets (OROA). Tobin’s Q and risk-adjusted Alpha of 
founder firms, by contrast, do not exhibit any difference. I ascribe the attenuation of the market 
value premium of founder firms to high volatility of stock prices and investors’ overreaction 
during the crisis. Further research shows that during the global financial crisis, founder firms 
invest significantly less and have better access to the credit market than non-family firms. My 
analysis suggests that the superior performance of founder firms is largely caused by less 
incentive to invest in risky projects with a high likelihood of failure in order to boost earnings 
during the crisis. Furthermore, my results reveal that founder firms bear the least agency costs, 
3and that Tobin’s Q and Alpha may not be the most appropriate measures of corporate 
performance during the financial crisis. 
      The third chapter investigates the relationship between firm performance (overwhelming 
majority of the sample is family firms) and a common family event--divorce. The chapter shows 
that divorce has a significant effect on economic outcome of an organization, in addition to its 
widely-documented impact on individuals. Using the same dataset in the first chapter, which 
covers almost all Danish private firms and CEO personal and family information (like CEO’s 
marriage history), I evaluate the economic consequence of CEO divorce on the firm he helms. 
The results show that firms subsequently underperform after CEO divorces, both relative to 
previous performance and relative to non-divorce firms. The negative effect of divorce is 
consistent whether I adopt all non-divorce firms or matched non-divorce firms as control. I use 
nearest neighbor propensity score matching to construct the control group of matched non-
divorce firms. My empirical results further suggest that marital conflict between the divorcing 
couple serves as one channel through which divorce strikes firm performance.  
4Dansk resume  
Afhandlingen undersøger familieejede virksomheders finansielle struktur og generelle 
præstation. Familieejede virksomheder udgør i dag en væsentlig del af de respektive nationale 
økonomier verden over. Dette har resulteret i en stigende akademisk interesse og denne 
afhandling søger dermed at bidrage til den begrænsede empiriske research indenfor området 
’Familieejede virksomheder’.  
Afhandlingen består af en introduktion efterfulgt af tre kapitler, som hver kan læses 
selvstændigt. Det første kapitel er udført i samarbejde med Professor Morten Bennedsen og Dr. 
Markus Ampenberger. Kapitlet i denne dissertation vil blive udgivet som Kapitel 6 i den 
kommende ”Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurial Finance” ved Oxford University Press. Andet 
og tredie kapitel er selvstændig arbejde af undertegnede. 
I det første kapitel diskuteres familieejede virksomheders finansielle struktur, med særligt 
focus på forholdet mellem gæld og egenkapital. Kapitlet består af to dele: i den første del 
gennemgås den eksisterende forskningslitteratur som omhandler teoretiske og empiriske 
undersøgelser af finansiel struktur i familieejede virksomheder. Litteraturstudiet viser at de 
væsentligste elements i familieejede virksomheders finansielle struktur udgøres af modvillighed 
til at løbe risici, Agency Theory og overvejelser omkring kontrol af virksomheden. Vi 
argumenterer for at risikoaversion og kontrolstrategier har modsatrettet indflydelse på det 
optimale niveau af gæld. På den ene side er den kontrollerende familie bag en familieejet 
virksomhed typisk en investor hvis resourcer hovedsageligt er bundet til firmaet, hvilket 
medfører at familieejede virksomheder generelt har mindre gæld. På den anden side ønsker disse 
familier at bevare kontrollen over firmaet, hvilket leder til en villighed til at rejse nye midler 
udenfor aktiemarkedet og dermed netop medfører en større grad af afhængighed af banker og 
5andre finansielle kilder. Litteraturstudiet afslører endvidere at man endnu ikke har dannet et 
homogent billede af familieejede virksomheders finansielle struktur, og at større undersøgelser af 
unoterede familieejede virksomheder er så godt som ikke-eksisterende. 
I kapitlets anden del foretager vi en empirisk analyse af danske virksomheders 
gældsniveau, på baggrund af data fra ca. 200.000 unoterede og noterede danske virksomheder. 
Igennem de sidste ti år har der været et generelt, signifikant fald i alle virksomheders 
gældsniveau, både blandt familieejede og ikke-familieejede. Medens små virksomheder har det 
laveste gældsniveau, har nystartede virksomheder det højeste. Vi konkluderer at det er et af de 
familieejede virksomheders særpræg at risikoaversion og kontrolstrategier, snarere end andre 
virksomhedsspecifikke problemstillinger, ligger til grund for familieejede virksomheders 
generelt lavere niveau af gæld.
I andet kapitel undersøges, med udgangspunkt i undersøgelserne fra Kapitel et, hvorvidt 
familieejede virksomheder med deres lavere gældsniveau har klaret sig bedre i den nuværende, 
globale, økonomiske krise. Jeg har konstrueret en database, som dækker virksomheder fra S&P 
500 (USA), FTSE100 (England), DAX 30 (Tyskland), CAC 40 (Frankrig) og FTSE MIB 40 
(Italien) gennem perioden 2006-2010, og påviser at familieejede virksomheder generelt ikke har 
klaret sig bedre end andre virksomheder under krisen. Dog viser tallene at familieejede 
virksomheder med en aktivt deltagene grundlægger, som administrerende direktør, 
bestyrelsesmedlem eller væsentlig medejer, har klaret sig bedre end andre typer virksomheder i 
forhold til afkast fra aktiver (OROA). Tobin’s Q og risikotilpasset Alpha af 
grundlæggerkontrollerede virksomheder viser derimod ingen forskel. Jeg tilskriver dette at 
grundlæggerkontrollerede virksomheders højere værdi på aktiemarkedet gradvist forsvinder med 
aktieprisers højere volatilitet, samt til investorers over-reaktioner under krisen. Undersøgelserne 
6viser at grundlæggerkontrollerede virksomheder har investeret betydeligt mindre, og har bedre 
adgang til kreditmarkedet, end andre former for virksomheder. Min analyse åbner for 
muligheden for at grundlæggerkontrollerede virksomheders bedre resultater hovedsageligt 
skyldes en mindre tilskyndelse til investeringer i risikable men potentielt meget profitable 
projekter i forsøget på at skaffe kapital under en økonomisk krise. Analysen viser endvidere at 
grundlæggerkontrollerede virksomheder har færre udgifter til Agency Costs, og at Tobin’s Q og 
Alpha ikke er optimale redskaber til at måle virksomheders præstationer under en økonomisk 
krise.
I tredie kapitel undersøges forholdet mellem virksomhedspræstation, ud af en gruppe 
hvoraf hovedparten består af familieejede virksomheder, og en stadigt hyppigere forekommende  
familiebegivenhed: Skilsmisse. Analysen påviser at skilsmisser har en betydelig effekt på 
organisationens økonomiske resultater, udover den specifikke påvirkning af de involverede 
enkeltpersoner. Udfra det samme sæt data som blev benyttet i Kapitel et, hvilket dækker næsten 
alle danske privatejede virksomheder, og inkluderer personlig og familierelateret information om 
administrerende direktører såsom ægteskabshistorie, foretages en vurdering af de økonomiske 
konsekvenser af en administrerende direktørs skilsmisse for den virksomhed han eller hun 
bestyrer. Undersøgelserne viser at virksomhederne opnår dårligere resultater efter en 
administrerende direktørs skilsmisse, både i forhold til egne tidligere resultater, og i forhold til 
andre typer virksomheder under samme omstændigheder. Skilsmissens negative effekt er 
konsekvent, uanset om jeg bruger alle ikke-skilsmisseramte virksomheder eller udvalgte ikke-
skilsmisseramte virksomheder som kontrolgruppe (jeg benytter Nearest Neighbor Propensity 
Score Matching under konstruktionen af en kontrolgruppe af udvalgte ikke-skilsmisseramte 
7virksomheder). Resultaterne af mine empiriske undersøgelser viser endvidere, at konflikt mellem 
skilsmisseparterne udgør en type gennem hvilken skilsmissen rammer virksomhedens præstation.  
8Introduction
Family firms occupy a large proportion of national economies around the world (LaPorta et al., 
1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Klein, 2000; Morck and Yeung, 2003). In Asia and Western 
Europe, family firms play a predominant role in listed firms (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and 
Lang, 2002; Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010). Despite increasing attentions to family firms by 
researchers, empirical studies on family firms are still limited and challenging. There are mainly 
two reasons. First, restricted data availability, especially in private family firms, makes large 
scale analysis difficult. Second, no definition of family firms is widely-accepted (Bennedsen et al, 
2010). Empirical results are sensitive to heterogeneous definitions of family firms.  
      The dissertation addresses these two problems by using informative Danish and international 
datasets and incorporating various definitions of family firms into analyses. The dissertation 
contributes to the limited empirical literature of family firms and deepening our understandings 
of the characteristics and behaviors of family firms.  
       The first chapter of the dissertation discusses the capital structure of family firms. The 
chapter begins with a literature review on existing theoretical and empirical research in the 
capital structure of family firms. We point out that risk aversion, agency theory, and control 
considerations are the most important theories to explain capital structure in family firms. We 
argue that risk aversion and control considerations have opposing impacts on the optimal choice 
of debt leverage of family firms. On one hand, controlling families of family firms are typically 
non-diversified investors. Most of their wealth and human capital are bounded to their companies. 
Therefore, less debt is adopted to avoid financial distress. On the other hand, controlling families 
have strong incentive to maintain family control over their companies. The control 
considerations prevent family firms from issuing new equity to outsiders and therefore often 
9result in stronger dependence on debt financing. The literature review also shows that evidence 
on capital structure choices of family firms is mixed and inconclusive. Large-scale evidence on 
private family firms is almost missing.  
      Next, we present an empirical analysis of the leverage of family firms in Denmark, using an 
informative dataset covering around 200,000 private and public Danish firms. We find that 
family firms are less leveraged than non-family firms, independent of which type of family firms 
we define: (1) family owned firms, where one or multi members from the same family together 
hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares; (2) CEO/owner family firms, where the CEO is 
simultaneously a significant shareholder (at least 5 percent); and (3) CEO family succession 
firms, where there has been at least one CEO family succession in the firm. Over the past decade, 
there has been a significant decline in the leverage of all firms, both family and non-family firms 
in Denmark. This development is attributable to the tax policy of the Danish government to 
reduce the tax shield associated with debt financing. We further find that small firms have the 
lowest leverage and entrepreneurial firms have the highest. Our results indicate that unique 
features of family firms like risk aversion and control considerations, rather than differences in 
other firm-specific characteristics account for the lower levels of leverage in family firms 
      Since the inception of family firm research, one central question is whether family firms are 
an effective organizational form. The second chapter provides new evidence examining whether 
family firms are superior performers during the global financial crisis heralded by the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brother in 2008. I construct a dataset covering firms from S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 
(UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France), and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) during the period of 
2006-2010, In my study, I define four types of family firms: (1) founder firms, where the 
founder/founders of the firms holds/hold a position/positions as a board member, CEO, or a 
10 
blockholder (at least a 5 percent shareholding). (2) heir firms, where the heir/heirs (by blood or 
by marriage) of the founding family holds/hold a position/positions either as a board member, 
CEO, or a blockholder; (3) family-owned firms, where one or several members from the same 
family hold more than 10 percent of the outstanding shares; and (4) leader/owner firms, where 
the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a blockholder.  
      I find that broadly defined family firms do not outperform non-family firms during the crisis. 
However, founder firms outperform non-family firms by 18 percent in Operating Return on 
Assets (OROA). Tobin’s Q and risk-adjusted Alpha of founder firms, by contrast, do not exhibit 
any difference. I interpret the attenuation of the market value premium of founder firms as the 
result of high volatility of stock prices and investors’ overreaction during the crisis (Veronesi, 
1999; Glode et al., 2010). Further research shows that during the global financial crisis, founder 
firms invest less and enjoy better access to the credit market. I explain the outperformance of 
founder firms in OROA as follows: The CEOs of non-family firms are myopic and have more 
incentive to over-invest in risky projects to boost current earnings under the pressure of 
managerial dismissal when stock prices slump in harsh economic conditions. Unlike non-family 
firms, founder firms aim to keep a sustainable growth for their young firms. They are more long-
term oriented and take a more conservative investment strategy during the crisis. Risky projects, 
especially those financed by short-term debt, are most likely to fail with financial constraints. 
Therefore, over-investment with insufficient financing resources leads to project failure and 
further underperformance of non-family firms relative to founder firms because of a dry-out of 
bank loans during the crisis. Heir firms are very similar to non-family firms. After several 
generations, the firms with strong family characteristics in their early stage gradually develop 
into professionally-managed firms. It is likely that the CEO in an heir firm is not from the 
11 
founding family. Like professionally-run non-family firms, heir firms are likely to suffer from 
the same myopic investment strategy to boost current earnings. Family-owned and leader/owner 
firms are mature corporations. They may not focus on the growth opportunities as much as 
founder firms do in the early stage of the founder firms. During the crisis, the controlling family 
or individual has more incentive than the founder to over-invest to boost short-term earnings, as 
the family or individual needs to rapidly recover loss in the capital market. As a result, the 
family-owned firms and leader/owner firms underperform the founder firms because of their 
over-investment.  
      My results reveal that founder firms bear the least agency costs, and that Tobin’s Q and 
Alpha may not be the most appropriate measures of corporate performance during the financial 
crisis. 
      Family firms feature intertwinement of business and family (Lansberg, 1988; Shama, 2004). 
The characteristics, events and interactions of multi-stakeholders in the controlling family might 
have an impact on the decision-making and other outcomes of family firms by means of 
ownership structure, management and governance (Astrachan et al., 2002). However, empirical 
research is limited. The third chapter of the dissertation aims to contribute to the literature of 
family firms by estimating the economic consequence of a family event -- CEO divorce on the 
firm he helms. This chapter uses the same Danish dataset as the first chapter. The dataset covers 
almost all the Danish firms’ CEO personal and family information (like CEO’s marriage 
history). Family firms overwhelmingly dominate the sample.  
      A leading challenge of treatment (CEO divorce is the treatment) effect estimation is the 
endogeneity of treatment. CEO divorces are not randomly assigned to the sample. Divorce CEOs 
and firms might be unobservably different from non-divorce ones. If I directly compare 
12 
performance change before and after divorce years of divorce firms with that of all non-divorce 
firms, the estimation suffers from selection bias. I adopt several empirical methods to tackle this 
issue. The main identification strategy is to construct a reliable counterfactual using nearest 
neighbor Propensity Score (PS) matching estimator similar to the approach by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983), Abadie and Imbens (2007) and Malmendier and Tate (2009). I first run a probit 
regression to predict divorce based on matching variables, which represent CEO, CEO family 
and firm characteristics in the pre-treatment year (one year prior to the divorce calendar year). 
Next, I obtain a sample of matched non-divorce firms by matching each divorce firm to a non-
divorce firm, which has the closest predicted likelihood of divorce (propensity score) to the 
actual divorce firm. 
      The results show that CEO divorce has a significant negative impact on economic outcome 
of the firm he heads. A large body of literature documents the impact of divorce on individuals. 
My paper gives the first evidence showing the impact is extended to an organizational level. 
Firms subsequently underperform after the CEO divorce, both relative to previous performance 
and relative to non-divorce firms. The negative effect of divorce is consistent whether I adopt all 
non-divorce firms or matched non-divorce firms as control.  
      Next, I explore the mechanism through which CEO divorce hits firm performance. I assume 
that marital conflict prevails in each divorcing couple around divorce year and examine whether 
marital conflict strikes firm performance. I approach the task by examining the impact of joint-
management (both of the divorcing couple are top managers/board members) on firm 
performance during the divorce period (5 consecutive year window centered by the divorce 
year). The fixed effect estimator proves the cost of marital conflict. An alternative interpretation 
13 
of this finding is asset expropriation or rent seeking from a self-interested spouse board member 
(top manager) in a shortly-cracked marriage. 
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The Capital Structure of Family Firms 
Markus Ampenberger, Morten Bennedsen and Haoyong Zhou 
1. Introduction 
Research on capital structure deals with the question of how firms finance their real 
investment. In this chapter we examine capital structures in closely held family firms, 
with a focus on the debt-equity mix. This topic is important for at least two reasons. First, 
family firms are the predominant organizational structure around the world. Within the 
past decade, several studies have shown that, outside the United States and United 
Kingdom, concentrated ownership structures and family capitalism are common even 
among listed firms (LaPorta et al. 1999; Claessens at al. 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002; 
Bennedsen and Nielsen 2010). Although large-scale empirical evidence is so far missing, 
the conventional view is that family firms are even more prevalent among closely held 
private firms. Second, there is currently a controversial debate within the popular press on 
whether family firms can better survive the financial crisis.1 Although this is a complex 
issue, the firm’s capital structure and its dependency on debt financing should be 
important determinants in answering this question. Hence it is interesting to see whether 
family firms in comparison to non-family firms are more or less conservative in terms of 
debt financing. 
The chapter has two parts. In the first part we provide a brief literature review on 
existing theoretical and empirical research in the capital structure of family firms. We 
1 For example, see Economist, January 22, 2009. 
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argue that there are several important aspects of being a closely held family firm that 
have opposing impacts on the optimal choice of debt leverage. One important feature is 
that families are typically nondiversified investors that not only have most of their wealth 
tied to the company but also often their human capital. Another salient feature is that 
families want to have control over their company. This control objective restricts the 
willingness to raise new capital outside the family and therefore often results in a stronger 
dependence on banks and various forms of debt instruments. 
In the second part we provide an empirical analysis of the leverage structure of 
family firms in Denmark. Using a unique data set we can track the family behind each of 
the 200,000 Danish firms and categorize the firms into family or non-family firms. We 
use three definitions of family firms in the analysis: (1) multiple family members owning 
the firm; (2) a family owner is also CEO; and (3) there has been at least one family 
succession in the firm. 
Our empirical analysis derives a number of interesting results about capital 
structures of family firms. Family firms tend to be less leveraged than non-family firms, 
independent of which type of family firms. Over the past ten years, there has been a 
significant decline in the leverage of all firms, both family and non-family. Leverage of 
family firms is increasing in size but is decreasing in age. Altogether our results indicate 
that the unique features of families do significantly affect the choice of leverage in the 
firms that these families control and own. 
16 
2. Family firms and capital structure – a review of the literature 
We begin this section with an overview of the main capital structure theories that are 
relevant in the context of family firms. Following the theoretical survey, we summarize 
the limited existing empirical evidence on capital structure decisions in family firms.2
Even after five decades of capital structure research, there is no universal theory 
to explain why some firms heavily use debt to finance real investment while others rely 
more on equity.3 No doubt the starting point of research on capital structure is the seminal 
work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), who argue that in a world without capital-market 
frictions, financing—and thus the debt-equity-mix—is irrelevant for investment. In such 
a setting, the firm is a simple production function that conducts NPV-positive projects 
and omits NPV-negative projects.4 However, the assumption of perfect and complete 
capital markets is not realistic. Instead transaction costs, taxes, information asymmetries, 
and agency problems between management and the suppliers of financing, among others, 
create frictions that are not negligible.5
Subsequently two major paradigms developed. The trade-off theory argues that 
firms balance the tax advantage of an additional unit of debt against the costs of potential 
financial distress (Modigliani and Miller 1963).6 The implication of the trade-off theory is 
2 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive review of the large literature on capital  
structure research in general. See Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001) for two excellent surveys of    
 this literature. 
3 Cf. Myers (2001, 2004). Sometimes this question is referred to as the “capital structure puzzle.”  
4 NPV refers to net present value.  
5 The implication of this principal-agent conflict is, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out, that capital 
providers have to ensure—by introducing a corporate governance structure—that they can realize a return   
on their investment. 
6 In most developed economies, interest payments are tax deductible, while dividends are not. From that 
Perspective, debt is more favorable than equity as long as the firm is profitable. However, a larger debt 
ratio increases the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
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that firms follow a target capital structure that is related to their preference for tax savings 
versus bankruptcy risk. 
The other major paradigm is the pecking order theory (Greenwald et al. 1984; 
Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984). According to this theory, firms prefer to use 
retained earnings, safe debt, risky debt, mezzanine-finance, and equity, in this order, to 
finance real investment. Since equity is both at the beginning and the end of this pecking 
order there is no optimal capital structure that firms follow. The implication is simply that 
the capital structure is the result of a number of subsequent financing events driven 
mainly by the firm’s profitability and the need to use external financing sources for real 
investment.7 While the trade-off theory recognizes market imperfections, such as taxes 
and costs of financial distress, the pecking order theory takes into account information 
asymmetries between market participants. 
Family firms differ from non-family firms in some important aspects. First, the 
family invests a significant part of its private wealth into the family business. Hence firms 
become family-owned. However, as argued above, many family firms are not only 
family-owned but also under family management. In such a case, family members 
invest—in addition to their financial wealth—their entire human capital into the family 
firm. Both aspects can lead to risk aversion.8 Negative firm performance, financial 
distress, or, in extreme cases, bankruptcy can hence be considered a total loss from the 
families’ perspective. 
Second, families have often invested in the firm for many years, if not for more 
than one generation, and thus family firms tend to be governed for the long term. This is 
7 A number of empirical studies have tested these two theories. See, for example, Fama and French (2002).
8 See Berk et al. (2010) for the theoretical argument that even salaried managers become risk averse   
because of their large human capital investment in the firm. 
18 
related to the desire of the founder or descendents to bequeath the family business to 
future generations (Chami 2001; James 1999). With regard to the trade-off theory we 
would expect that the risk aversion and the long-term orientation lead to more 
conservative financing choices in family firms. Concerning the trade-off between equity 
and debt, risk aversion might increase the families’ marginal preference for equity in 
comparison to debt. From this perspective, if we compare the two types of firms, we 
expect family firms to have lower leverage ratios than non-family firms. 
Families do prefer to control their businesses.9 If retained earnings are not 
sufficient to finance growth and real investment, family firms have the option of issuing 
equity (private equity; the larger, capital-market-oriented family businesses may also 
issue public equity) or using debt (from banks, credit mortgage institutes, or other 
creditors or by issuing corporate bonds). Hence they can choose between a dilution of 
their ownership stake (and hence their control) or allowing for creditor monitoring by 
banks. As the review of the empirical literature will show, there is contradictory evidence 
about which choice is dominant. While Mishra and McConaughy (1999) argue that listed 
family firms in the United States prefer less debt with regard to control considerations, 
Ellul (2008) points in the opposite direction. Based on a cross-country study of listed 
firms, he concludes that the presence of family blockholders is positively correlated with 
leverage since family owners prefer debt over equity in order to avoid a dilution of their 
ownership stake. Hence, from the perspective of control considerations, it remains an 
empirical question whether family firms have less or more leverage than non-family 
firms. 
9 See Villalonga and Amit (2009a) with regard to listed family firms in the United States and Bennedsen  
and Nielsen (2010) with respect to listed firms in Western Europe. 
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The third theory discussed in this context is the principal-agent theory. In his 
seminal paper, Jensen (1986) argues that debt is a useful mechanism to discipline 
management. Fixed payment of interest and principal takes away the “free cash flow” 
that management can use to spend on inefficient projects.10 However, the main reason for 
the existence of agency costs is the separation of ownership and control. In the case of an 
owner-manager in the sense of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) model, agency costs are 
zero. The manager (who simultaneously owns 100 percent of the firm) chooses a level of 
effort that maximizes his utility (derived from firm value and private consumption). 
Given that the separation of ownership and control is less pronounced in private family 
firms (since the family is a large owner and often involved in firm management), there 
might be less need for the disciplining monitoring role of debt. From this perspective we 
expect leverage to be lower in family firms than in non-family firms. 
Empirical Evidence 
As a starter, we want to emphasize that empirical research on family firms has a 
comparatively short history. This is so for a number of reasons. First, with regard to 
publicly listed firms the idea that salaried managers rather than controlling owners are 
responsible for running large firms has dominated the literature since the seminal work of 
Berle and Means (1932). But this picture changed during the past decade. La Porta et al.
(1999, 511) study ownership structures around the world and conclude, “As we look 
outside the United States, particularly at countries with poor shareholder protection, even 
10 See Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990). The free cash flow hypothesis to discipline management is the main  
argument behind the well-known phenomenon that private equity investors change the financial structure  
after leveraged buyout transaction. See Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) for a review of this literature.
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the largest firms tend to have controlling shareholders. Sometimes that shareholder is the 
State, but more often it is a family, usually the founder of the firm or his descendants.” In 
a similar vein, Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), and Bennedsen and 
Nielsen (2010) show that family firms play a predominant role even among listed firms in 
Asia and Western Europe. 
Second, with regard to private firms systematic large-scale research is difficult 
due to limited data availability. Consequently the majority of research in corporate 
finance has focused on publicly listed firms, although it is widely accepted that family 
firms are much more common among private firms than among listed firms.11 From this 
perspective it is essential, albeit a challenge, for future research on family firms to 
analyze both private and listed firms. 
A third obstacle to systematic research on family firms is the lack of a generally 
accepted definition of what constitutes a family business (Bennedsen et al.2010). Several 
studies show that the actual definition of a family firm does have a strong implication for 
the results of empirical family business analysis (see Miller et al. 2007; Villalonga and 
Amit 2006). Moreover a comparison of the results across different empirical studies is 
complicated with respect to heterogeneous definitions. 
Before we summarize the limited empirical evidence on capital structure choices 
in family firms, we want to stress the importance of the institutional environment. 
Starting with the study of Rajan and Zingales (1995), a growing body of empirical 
literature has recently focused on cross-country determinants of capital structure choices. 
The early studies conclude that in general the same firm-specific characteristics that are 
correlated with leverage in the United States also affect capital structures in other 
11 Three notable exceptions are the studies by Bennedsen et al. (2006, 2007) and Franks et al. (2011). 
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developed countries (Rajan and Zingales 1995) and developing economies (Booth et al.
2001). Most recent studies argue that country-specific factors are also major determinants 
of firms’ capital structure. They show that the development of a country’s legal system 
and institutions (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2002; Fan et al. 2008) as well as the 
financial system of an economy (Antoniou et al. 2008) affect leverage ratios directly and 
indirectly; that is, the importance of certain firm-specific characteristics to explain 
leverage ratios varies with the institutional environment (De Jong et al. 2008). 
Other authors argue that the institutional environment is not only important for 
listed but also for unlisted firms (Giannetti 2003; Hall et al. 2004). Unlisted firms 
operating in countries with less developed stock markets are more indebted (Giannetti 
2003). Against this background it is interesting to note that Denmark is a civil law 
country (with Scandinavian origin) with a bank-based financial system and concentrated 
ownership structures. Denmark provides an ideal research environment in the sense that 
family firms are of major importance for the Danish economy. For a detailed description 
of the institutional environment, see our discussion below. 
Empirical evidence on capital structure choices in family firms is limited. 
Agrawal and Nagajaran (1990) provide the starting point by arguing that listed firms in 
the United States with zero debt have higher managerial ownership with strong family 
ties in top management. They argue that managers choose zero-debt capital structures as 
a risk-reducing strategy: they aim to reduce the risk stemming from their undiversified 
investment and human capital. In a similar vein, Mishra and McConaughy (1999) show 
that family firms have lower debt ratios. They analyze a small sample of 105 family 
firms, in which the CEO is either the founder or a relative of the founder. The sample is 
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drawn from the population of the Business Week CEO 1000 and hence covers large listed 
firms in the United States. The authors use two matching samples based on industry 
classification and firm size: (1) an “ownership match” with a sample of firms that are 
characterized by similar levels of insider ownership, and (2) a “diffuse match” of widely 
held firms. Mishra and McConaughy find that family firms have a significantly lower 
leverage than non-family firms and argue that this is related to risk aversion and control 
considerations.
Anderson and Reeb (2003) use a panel of S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 1999 
to analyze differences between family and non-family firms in terms of diversification 
and leverage. In contrast to Mishra and McConaughy (1999), they do not detect any 
differences in terms of capital structure choices between the two groups. Anderson et al.
(2003) add to this literature by analyzing the costs of debt financing and the bondholder-
shareholder conflict. They use information about corporate bonds of large family firms in 
the S&P 500 and find that family firms have lower costs of debt financing, especially if 
family ownership is moderate. Anderson et al. argue that the interests of founding 
families and bondholders are better aligned in family firms than in firms with outside 
shareholders or dispersed ownership because of the long-term orientation and reputation 
concerns of founding families. 
Ellul (2008) analyzes an international data set from thirty-six countries and 
concludes that the presence of family blockholders leads to higher leverage ratios. 
Detailed evidence outside market-based economies is still limited; an exception is the 
study of Ampenberger et al. (2009) on Germany, a typical bank-based economy. They 
study a panel data set of 660 listed firms in Germany between 1995 and 2006. In 
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accordance with Mishra and McConaughy (1999), they find that family firms have lower 
leverage ratios than non-family firms. They further argue that family management is the 
main driver of this result. Furthermore leverage is particularly low if the founding family 
is a large shareholder and active in firm management at the same time. (see Table 2.1 for 
an overview of the empirical literature). 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
Overall our review of the empirical literature allows us to draw four main 
conclusions. First, country-specific aspects are important in the analysis of capital 
structure decisions. Second, so far there is no clear picture in the literature of whether 
family firms are more or less indebted than non-family firms. Third, the explanations 
employed by several studies are clearly related to the theories described in the previous 
section. In particular risk aversion, control consideration, and agency theory are the main 
explanations for observed differences between family firms and non-family firms in 
terms of capital structure choices. Fourth, large-scale evidence on private family firms is 
missing. This might be related to the lack of data on ownership and board structures of 
private family firms. Our data set on Danish firms allows us to overcome this obstacle 
and identify three types of family firms among both listed and unlisted firms in Denmark. 
Hence the aim of this chapter is to fill the research gap on capital structure choices in 
private family firms. 
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3. An Empirical Investigation of Capital Structure of Danish Family Firms 
In this section we discuss the picture of capital structure of Danish family firms. We start 
with a brief description of the Danish corporate governance system, since previous 
empirical work suggests that the institutional environment is important for capital 
structure choices (e.g., Antoniuo et al. 2008; Giannetti 2003; Hall et al. 2004). Then we 
give a detailed description of our data set. Finally, we show our univariate empirical 
results of capital structure choices in Danish family firms. 
Analyzing capital structure in Danish family firms is attractive for at least two 
reasons. First, similar to other larger European economies such as Germany, Denmark 
has a long tradition of family firms. In fact Danish family firms dominate the landscape 
of the national economy, and the capital structure of Danish firms is comparable to those 
of larger European countries (in our data set the average book leverage of Danish firms is 
0.56, the same as that of German listed firms, reported by Ampenberger et al., 2009). 
Second, the availability and quality of Danish data with respect to closely held 
firms are unique. In contrast to many other studies, this allows us to analyze capital 
structure decisions not only in listed but also unlisted family firms. Furthermore we are 
able to consider the heterogeneity of family firms and identify three different groups of 
family firms: family-owned firms, CEO/owner family firms, and CEO family succession 
firms. 
In much the way the two countries are geographically close to each other, the 
Danish and German corporate governance systems are similar to a large extent. 
Belonging to a civil law institutional setting, Denmark resembles Germany in its legal 
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protection of investors (e.g., LaPorta et al. 1999). Unlike Anglo-Saxon economies, both 
countries have inactive takeover markets for corporate control. Ownership structures are 
highly concentrated and often family-based (Bennedsen and Nielsen 2010). In both 
countries, loans by banks and mortgage institutions are traditionally important financing 
sources for closely held firms. The bank-based character of the financial system is also 
reflected by the fact that only a small fraction of Danish firms is listed at the stock 
exchange (Lausten 2000). 
Danish firms are subject to a semi-two-tier board system, with a management 
board and a supervisory board, regulated by Danish corporate law. While the supervisory 
board is responsible for disciplining top management and making significant corporate 
decisions, such as nominating a new CEO, the management board manages the daily 
operations of firms. In contrast to countries with a pure two-tier board structure (such as 
Germany), the members of the management board are allowed to occupy up to half of the 
seats in the supervisory board. 
Sources of Data and Sampling Definitions 
In the following we use a database covering all private and public firms in Denmark (see 
Bennedsen et al. 2007) in a ten-year period, from 1998 to 2007. The main body of the 
data set is assembled by building on three data sources: 
1. Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB): This data set covers accounting 
and ownership information of all registered limited liability firms in 
Denmark. The data set is based on annual reports that all Danish 
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companies with limited liability are required to file with the Ministry of 
Economics and Business Affairs. The data include accounting data, 
information on the composition of the management board, and basic 
ownership structures. 
2. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen (E&S): This data set is administrated by 
Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen (the Danish Commerce and Companies 
Agency) at the Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs. It provides 
information on any change in the top management (CEO and board 
positions) of limited liability firms. 
3. The official Danish Civil Registration System: The third database, 
administrated by the Ministry of Interior, supplies us with detailed 
information about kinship and family ties within the Danish population. 
Based on these records, we can identify the kinships of departing and 
succeeding CEOs and individual shareholders, which is the cornerstone to 
identifying three distinct groups of family firms. 
An important challenge for any analysis of corporate governance mechanisms in 
family firms is the lack of a clear definition of what a family firm is (Bennedsen et al.
2010). Previous work has shown that the choice of the family firm definition can 
significantly affect the results of empirical studies (Villalonga and Amit 2006; Miller et 
al. 2007). One particular strength of our approach in this paper is that we are able to work 
with the following three overlapping definitions of family firms: 
1. Family-owned firms, defined as firms in which one or several members from 
the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares. 
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2. CEO/owner family firms, defined as firms in which the CEO is simultaneously 
a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 
percent. 
3. CEO family succession firms, which have experienced at least one CEO 
succession within the family between 1993 and 2005. 
Figure 3.1 shows the number of firms per year in our sample. Altogether we have 
around 73,000 firms in the beginning of our study and around 130,000 firms in 2006.12
The share of family firms first increases, then falls over time, but is significant in any 
year in our sample. 
[Insert Figure 3.1 here] 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the whole population of almost 
200,000 firms in our sample.13 Non-family firms are on average larger than family firms, 
with mean total assets of 358 million DKK, compared to 11 million DKK for family 
firms. However, the median size of family firms is similar to that of non-family firms. 
These results indicate a highly skewed distribution with regard to firm size, and in 
particular the existence of some extraordinarily large non-family firms. There is no 
significant difference in terms of firm age for the two groups. With respect to legal form 
composition, family firms are more often incorporated as ApS firms (Anpartsselskaber, 
limited liability companies) than non-family firms, while non-family firms use many 
12 From 2004 through 2006 Denmark experienced an extraordinary economic boom with annual GDP  
growth rates (nominal growth rates) of 2.3 percentage points (2004), 2.5 percentage points (2005), and 3.1  
percentage points (2006; World Bank 2009). During this period the number of established businesses   
increased substantially with respect to new start-up firms. However, most of them are categorized into our  
non-family firm group. In 2007 the economic growth slowed down to a rate of 1.8 percentage points. 
13 Altogether our sample consists of an unbalanced panel of almost 200,000 Danish firms with at least one  
firm-year observation during the 1998–2007 period. For example, the sample size is around 73,000 in 1998  
and 130,000 in 2006. 
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more other legal forms. Finally, both types of firms have a similar fraction of A/S 
(Aktieselskaber, joint stock companies) firms. 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
Empirical Results on Capital Structure Choices 
We start our analysis with a cross-country comparison, using evidence on capital 
structures in German and Japanese family firms and non-family firms (see Figure 3.2). 
The data from Germany are from Ampenberger et al. (2009), while the data about Japan 
are from Bennedsen et al. (2011). All three countries have in common that bank financing 
and family capitalism are important features of the economy. Hence in terms of the 
institutional environment the three countries are comparable. Two aspects are important. 
First, by and large the level of leverage (measured as total liabilities scaled by total 
assets) is in the same range in the three countries. Hence although Germany and Japan are 
among the strongest economies worldwide and much larger than the Danish economy in 
terms of GDP, the financing mix of debt and equity seems to be similar in the three 
countries. Second, the differences between family firms and non-family firms are the 
largest in Germany, followed by Denmark. In both countries family firms are less 
indebted than non-family firms. However, in Japan family firms and non-family firms 
seem to have relatively similar leverage. Overall this cross-country comparison suggests 
that despite being a small country, Denmark provides a good and representative economic 
setting for the analysis of capital structure decisions in family firms, at least for countries 
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with a bank-based financial system. However, the comparison suffers from definition 
inconsistency regarding family firms. 
[Insert Figure 3.2 here] 
Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of capital structure of Danish family firms and 
non-family firms in greater detail. The graph shows two interesting results. First, leverage 
is declining over time for both groups. The decrease is related to the Danish corporate tax 
policies over the years. Corporate tax rate has been reduced by 20 percent since 1989 
(Skat 2003), and interest deduction caps were introduced twice, in 1998 and 2007. The 
tax policy of the Danish government has reduced the value of the tax shield over time, 
and as a result it is less attractive for Danish firms to be highly leveraged. 
For our analysis the most striking insight from Figure 3.3 is that family firms are 
clearly less leveraged than non-family firms. This result holds for all years in our sample, 
and the difference varies from almost 0.3 percentage points (in 1998) to almost 7 
percentage points (in 2007). 
The result is consistent with the view that families are more exposed to financial 
risk with respect to their undiversified ownership stakes. As a consequence, in 
comparison to other types of controlling owners, families may optimally choose a lower 
degree of risk that is reflected in lower leverage ratios of the firms they control and own. 
[Insert Figure 3.3 here] 
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The result is also consistent with families’ strong desire to be in complete control. 
High levels of leverage typically would imply stronger monitoring and more negotiations 
with banks, mortgage credit institutes, and other debt providers. With regard to their 
control considerations, families want to avoid strong creditor monitoring and may 
therefore end up choosing a lower leverage level. 
An interesting observation is that the leverage of family firms decreases more 
over time than the leverage of non-family firms. We do not see any clear explanation of 
this trend. However, although all firms reduce their target leverage with respect to the 
decreasing attractiveness of the tax shield, non-family firms were overall more aggressive 
in using debt to finance new activities in this period of strong economic growth. 
In a second step, we distinguish between the three groups of family firms. Figure 
3.4 shows all Danish firms (family and non-family firms) in comparison to the three 
subgroups of family firms (family-owned firms, CEO/owner firms, and CEO family 
succession firms). As we can observe, all the three groups follow similar capital structure 
patterns; that is, their leverage decreases over time. In this sense, it seems that all three 
groups of family firms are similar. In 2007, which is the last year of the observation 
period, family-owned firms and CEO family succession firms have a debt ratio of 0.443 
and 0.475, respectively, while CEO/owner family firms have a ratio of 0.460. 
[Insert Figure 3.4 here] 
The main point is that the differences between the three groups are small and 
there is no clear-cut evidence that any of the subgroups has a particularly low or high 
leverage. However, the more detailed depiction supports the view that by and large 
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family firms have less leverage in comparison to non-family firms and that leverage 
decreases over time. Regarding the subgroup of family succession firms, we have also 
analyzed the effect of succession and found that the leverage ratio decreases around the 
succession event (unreported results). However, without any further analysis we doubt 
that this is a causal effect, as the overall leverage in Danish firms is declining in a similar 
manner during our observation period. Hence our analysis seems to reflect the time trend 
of decreasing leverage rather than a causal effect of within-family succession. 
So far we have argued that the different governance structure and unique 
characteristics of family firms are important determinants of capital structure choices in 
Danish firms. However, such decisions might also be driven by other firm-specific 
characteristics. For that reason we test the robustness of our results by analyzing the 
impact of the legal form, firm size (measured by total assets), firm age, and industry 
affiliation. 
In Figure 3.5 we divide the three different subsamples of family firms into two 
groups according to their legal form: A/S firms and ApS firms. A/S firms can be listed 
firms, but ApS firms cannot. The figure shows us that in general A/S firms have higher 
leverage ratios than ApS firms. In Denmark the legal requirements to establish A/S firms 
are stricter with respect to minimum capital requirements and the implementation of 
corporate governance mechanisms. One explanation for the difference in leverage may be 
that A/S firms are on average larger than ApS firms and in general have to offer more 
fixed assets as collateral. 
[Insert Figure 3.5 here] 
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Firm size might be a major determinant of capital structure decisions. To 
investigate this issue in more detail we used firm size to divide the population of family 
firms and non-family firms in three groups of equal size. (We used the 33.3rd percentile 
and 66.7th percentile in firm size to build three groups: small firms, medium-size firms, 
and large firms.) Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the results for family and non-family firms. 
Among the non-family firms (Figure 3.7), the smallest have the lowest leverage ratio, 
followed by medium and large firms. If larger firms have a higher creditworthiness, more 
tangible assets as collateral, and better access to debt markets, this result is exactly 
expected. The comparatively low leverage of small non-family firms might be an 
indication that especially the smaller firms in Denmark face financial constraints and 
have a limited access to debt markets. 
With regard to family firms, the picture is somewhat different: while the group 
with the smallest firms still has the lowest leverage, the differences between the three 
groups in terms of debt-equity ratio are much smaller. Moreover the medium-size firms 
and not the largest firms are most indebted. This somewhat surprising result might be 
related to the fact that family firms are on average smaller than non-family firms. 
Furthermore the variance in firm size in this group is much lower than the variance in 
firm size among non-family firms. For example, non-family firms have a mean firm size 
(measured by total assets) of 358 million DKK, while the median firm size is 3 million 
DKK. In comparison, family firms have mean total assets of 11 million DKK and median 
total assets of 3 million DKK. This shows that the skewness of the distribution in firm 
size is much higher among non-family firms than among family firms. Hence if firm size 
is a major determinant of capital structure it is more likely to produce stronger differences 
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in terms of capital structure choices between the three subgroups of non-family firms 
(according to firm size) than among the family firms. 
[Insert Figures 3.6 and 3.7 here] 
As for the effect of firm age on leverage (Figures 3.8 and 3.9), we find that 
entrepreneurial firms (established after 1990) have the highest leverage, followed by 
young firms (established after 1980). This is true for both family and non-family firms. 
Middle-aged and old firms (established before 1980 and 1945, respectively) do not show 
much difference in terms of leverage. The result might be surprising at first glance, but 
we have used very broad ranges to define the four groups of firms according to their age. 
For example, the entrepreneurial firms were established after 1990 and hence cover a 
heterogeneous group of firms themselves. They do not only consist of start-up firms that 
usually lack tangible assets, a cash-flow history, and borrowing capacity. In this sense the 
age might be a proxy for the maturity of the sample firms. Hence entrepreneurial and 
younger firms might grow stronger than the other two groups and have greater need for 
external capital. This might be reflected in higher leverage ratios if compared to the other 
two groups of older firms. Moreover the differences in terms of leverage among the four 
groups are not very large, indicating that firm age—at least measured in these broad 
ranges—does not have a strong impact on capital structure decisions. 
[Insert Figures 3.8 and 3.9 here] 
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Leverage ratios show a significant variation across industries. For example, Frank 
and Goyal (2009) analyze capital structures of listed firms in the United States and 
conclude that firms operating in industries in which the median firm has a high leverage 
tend to also prefer high debt levels. This might be related to common competitive forces 
within the industry. Figure 3.10 shows the leverage ratios of family and non-family firms 
in Denmark across different industries in the year 2007. We used a broad industry 
classification with eight industries. The figure confirms that there are strong differences 
in terms of leverage ratios across industries. For example, while construction has 
particular high leverage ratios, firms in the finance and business activities sectors have a 
comparatively low leverage. Overall there is no consistent pattern over all industries: 
within some industries, such as finance and business activities, family firms have on 
average lower leverage ratios than non-family firms, while in other industries, such as 
electricity, gas, and water supply, family firms have on average higher leverage than non-
family firms. Recently Villalonga and Amit (2009b) have argued that family firms are not 
randomly assigned across industries, but are more likely to control certain industries. 
With regard to their finding, one concern with our analysis is that family firms are 
overrepresented in low-leverage industries and underrepresented in high-leverage 
industries. However, we find that the industry distribution of family and non-family firms 
is similar. Although industry affiliation is certainly a major determinant of capital 
structure, our results—that family firms on average have lower leverage ratios than non-
family firms—are not driven by an over- or underrepresentation of family firms in certain 
industries.
[Insert Figure 3.10 here] 
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Our descriptive robustness tests suggest that family characteristics (and not the 
legal form, firm size, firm age, or industry affiliation) are driving the lower leverage in 
family firms. To gain better insight in terms of the relationship between capital structure 
and bankruptcy, it would be interesting to know how the number of bankruptcies is 
distributed among family and non-family firms. However, we do not have clear-cut 
information on bankruptcy filings in our database. As a proxy, we have analyzed the 
number of firm exits in our panel data set. We find that indeed the relative number of 
exits is on average higher in non-family firms than in family firms. Over the 1998–2006 
period (before the financial crisis), the average exit rate among non-family firms is 6.53 
percent p.a. By contrast, the relative number of family firms that leaves the sample is on 
average only 4.44 percent p.a. between 1998 and 2006. This provides preliminary 
evidence that the more conservative financing policies in family firms are correlated with 
a lower number of bankruptcies. Some caveats remain to this simple comparison. First, 
we do not know whether an exit is indeed related to a bankruptcy case or instead has 
other reasons (e.g., mergers and acquisitions). Second, only a multivariate analysis can 
show whether the potential differences really exist among family and non-family firms in 
the relationship between leverage and bankruptcies. Third, the causality between capital 
structure and bankruptcies is unclear. Does higher leverage among non-family firms lead 
to more bankruptcies relative to family firms? Or do non-family firms have higher 
leverage ratios because of a larger number of bankruptcies? It goes beyond the scope of 
this chapter to analyze these questions in detail. However, this is certainly an interesting 
area for future research. 
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As a final robustness check we identify sixty-two family firms from the subgroup 
of CEO/owner family firms that experienced a transition from a family firm to a non-
family firm. Instead of passing the firm to their heirs, the family transfers 100 percent of 
their ownership stake to outside investors. Figure 3.11 shows the development of the 
leverage ratio five years before and after the transition. The figure shows that the leverage 
ratio is increasing by about 5 percentage points (from 61 to 66 percent) within the five 
years before and after the transition. This is another indication that common 
characteristics of family firms, such as lower agency costs, risk aversion, and control 
considerations, have a strong impact on the capital structure choices of closely held 
family firms. 
[Insert Figure 3.11 here] 
4. Concluding remarks 
Our discussion of capital structure choices in family firms is based on a review of 
relevant capital structure theories and the limited existing empirical evidence. We 
provided empirical evidence on capital structure decisions in both listed and unlisted 
family firms in Denmark, an economy where family firms traditionally are a predominant 
organizational form. 
The literature review shows that among the multitude of capital structure theories, 
the most important ones to explain leverage ratios in family firms seem to be risk 
aversion, agency theory, and control considerations. However, the literature review also 
shows that even after a decade of research there is still inconclusive evidence on capital 
structure choices in family firms. Large-scale evidence on private family firms is missing 
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almost entirely. Moreover the literature to date neglects the fact that empirical results 
depend largely on how a family business is defined and that family businesses themselves 
constitute a heterogeneous group of firms. 
In part, we can overcome this obstacle and provide an empirical analysis based on 
a large data set of 200,000 Danish firms. While our data set also covers listed firms, the 
majority of the firms are unlisted, closely held firms in Denmark. In particular, we 
consider the heterogeneity of family firms by identifying three different groups of family 
businesses: family-owned businesses (where one or several members from the same 
family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares), CEO-owner firms 
(where the CEO is at the same time a significant shareholder), and CEO family 
succession firms (based on the succession of family members). We find that closely held 
family firms have significantly lower leverage compared with non-family firms. This 
result is consistent for all three groups of family firms with different definitions, and can 
be explained by trade-off theory, risk aversion, and control considerations. 
Moreover we can show that leverage ratios among Danish firms are declining 
over time. This development, which is true for both family and non-family firms, is 
related to the tax policy of the Danish government. In comparison to debt, equity became 
more attractive during the past decade because the Danish authorities systematically 
reduced the tax shield associated with debt financing. Consequently Danish firms 
strengthened their equity ratio significantly. 
Firm legal forms, sizes, and ages do affect the choice of capital structure in family 
firms. We show that whereas small firms have the lowest leverage, entrepreneurial firms 
have the highest. Danish joint stock companies (A/S) are more leveraged than limited 
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liability companies (ApS). In addition, leverage ratios exhibit a large variance across 
industries. However, in terms of industry distribution, we do not find significant 
differences between family and non-family firms in our sample. Our robustness tests lead 
us to conclude that the unique characteristics of family firms, such as risk aversion and 
control considerations, rather than differences in other firm-specific characteristics are 
responsible for the lower levels of leverage on average in closely held family firms. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of Empirical Studies on Capital Structures in Family Firms 
Author Sample Data Sources Method of Analysis Summary of Findings 
Agrawal and 
Nagajaran (1990) 
71 listed U.S. firms 
without any debt 
(all-equity firms) 
matched with 71 
indebted firms with 
similar industry 
affiliation and firm 
size 
Firms’ proxy 
statement 
(ownership and 
board structures), 
Compustat 
(accounting
information) 
Descriptive analysis Firms without debt have on 
average higher managerial 
ownership than comparable 
indebted firms. The results are 
statistically significant if there are 
kinships between members of top 
management or between top 
management and important 
shareholders, but insignificant for 
high managerial ownership without 
such kinships. 
Mishra and 
McConaughy 
(1999)
105 U.S. family 
firms and two 
matched samples 
with 105 widely 
held firms and 105 
firms with similar 
levels of insider 
ownership 
The CEO Business 
Week 1000 
(identification of 
family firms), 
accounting data 
from 1986 and 1987 
(average values) 
Multivariate cross-
sectional analysis 
(OLS-regression)  
Family firms have lower leverage 
than non-family firms. The 
comparison with the two matched 
samples shows that this is a real 
family firm effect rather than an 
insider ownership effect. 
Anderson and Reeb 
(2003)
319 industrial firms 
from the S&P 500 
in the 1993– 1999 
period (2,108 firm-
year observations) 
Firms’ proxy 
statement 
(ownership and 
board structures), 
Gale Business 
Resources, 
Hoovers, press 
research (company 
founders),
Compustat 
(accounting
information) 
Descriptive 
analysis, 
multivariate panel 
regression analysis 
(pooled OLS, logit-
models) 
There is no difference between 
family and non-family firms in 
terms of leverage. 
Anderson et al. (2003) 252 industrial firms 
from the S&P 500 
from 1993 to 1998 
(1,052 firm-year 
observations) 
Lehman Brothers 
bond database 
(information about 
bonds), firms’ 
proxy statement 
Descriptive 
analysis, 
multivariate 
analysis 
Founding family ownership 
reduces the cost of debt. In 
particular, family firms enjoy a 32 
basis points lower cost of debt 
financing relative to non-family 
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(ownership and 
board structures), 
Gale Business 
Resources, 
Hoovers, press 
research (company 
founders),
Compustat 
(accounting
information) 
firms. Moderate family ownership 
up to 12% provides the strongest 
value gains, while costs of debt 
increase if family ownership is 
larger than 12% (but costs of debt 
are still lower than in non-family 
firms). Founding families are a 
unique shareholder category, with 
long-term commitment, 
undiversified portfolios, and 
reputation concerns. These aspects 
appear to reduce agency costs 
between shareholder and 
bondholder, resulting in lower 
costs of debt financing. 
Author Sample Data Sources Method of analysis Summary of findings 
Ellul (2008) 3,608 listed firms 
from 36 countries in 
the 1996–2004 
period
Faccio and Lang 
(2002) data set, 
U.S. Fortune 500 
firms (as in 1994), 
non-European DRs 
(in 1994), 20-F 
forms and proxy 
statement, Amadeus 
database 
(ownership and 
board structure), 
Compustat and 
Worldscope 
(accounting data) 
Multivariate panel 
regression analysis 
(OLS-, firm-fixed 
effects-models) 
Family blockholders have a 
positive impact on leverage. The 
influence of family blockholders is 
stronger in countries with weak 
investor protection. Family 
blockholders prefer debt over 
equity to receive external finance 
in order to avoid a dilution of 
voting rights. Families are found to 
use leverage in a strategic way. 
They use it less when (a) they 
possess control-enhancing 
mechanisms, and (b) when their 
stake is high enough to allow them 
to have control anyway. 
Ampenberger et al. 
(2009)
660 listed firms 
from Germany in 
the 1995–2006 
period (5,135 firm-
year observations) 
Hoppenstedt 
Aktienführer
(ownership and 
board structures), 
Hoovers Company 
Profile, press 
research (founder 
information), 
Descriptive 
analysis, 
multivariate panel 
regression analysis 
(pooled OLS, 
between-estimates, 
firm-fixed-effects 
models), propensity 
Family firms have lower leverage 
ratios driven by family 
management rather than family 
ownership. A transition from a 
family firm to a non-family firm 
leads to a significant increase in 
leverage. These results seem to be 
related to agency and control 
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Worldscope and 
Datastream 
(accounting data) 
score-based 
matching 
theory. In particular, in a bank-
based economy, founding families 
may balance the dilution of their 
voting rights from external equity 
against strong creditor monitoring 
by banks rather then just prefer 
debt over equity. 
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Figure 3.1 Sample size of different firms every year 
Notes: 1. Family firms are the sum of all the three subgroups: family-owned firms, 
CEO/owner family firms, and CEO family succession firms. Every family firm is only 
considered once, even if it fulfills the criteria of more than one subgroup of family firms; 
that is, we erased overlapping family firms. 2. Non-family firms are all remaining 
registered Danish firms that do not fulfill our criteria of family firms. 3. Family-owned 
firms are defined as firms in which one or several members from the same family 
together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares. 4. CEO/owner family firms are 
defined as firms in which the CEO is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an 
outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. 5. CEO family succession firms are 
defined as firms that have experienced at least one CEO succession within the family 
during 1993–2005. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
14 There is overlapping across the three different types of family firms. 
15 We have used the year of incorporation in order to calculate the firm age for each year in our panel 
dataset. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the year of incorporation for all sample firms. This is 
the reason for the large decrease in the number of firms with available information about firm age as 
reported in our descriptive statistics. 
Non-family 
firms 
Family 
firms 
Family 
owned firms 
CEO/owner
family firms 
CEO family 
succession firms 
No. of firms 122365 73107 2998414 58044 3628 
No. of firms (with info. of legal form) 121761 72696 29866 57672 3603 
No. of firms (with info. of firm age) 2470615 28553 8253 24643 2379 
A/S proportion (%) 38.38 27.38 21.7 28.54 32.8 
ApS proportion (%) 50.12 71.9 77.07 71.34 66.89 
Other legal forms proportion (%) 11.5 0.72 1.23 0.12 0.31 
Average age 25.23 21.95 21.56 22.03 23.45 
Median age 18 18 18 18 20 
Average size (mil. DKK) 357.92 10.72 9.74 10.49 9.71 
Median size (mil. DKK) 3.45 2.73 2.47 2.84 3.12 
Average leverage (over the years) 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 
Median leverage (over the years) 0.6 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.55 
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Figure 3.2 The capital structure of family firms vs. non-family firms in Denmark, 
compared with those in Germany and Japan 
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Figure 3.3 The capital structure of Danish family firms vs. non-family firms 
Notes: 1. The vertical axis is average book leverage, calculated by book debt/total asset. 
2. Family firms are the sum of all the three subgroups: family-owned firms, CEO/owner 
family firms, and CEO family succession firms, erasing overlapping firms. 3. Non-family 
firms are all remaining registered Danish firms that do not fulfill our criteria of family 
firms. 4. Sample size of family firms is 73,107, and the universe of firms has around 
200,000 firms. 
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Figure 3.4 The capital structure of three type of Danish family firms 
Notes: 1. The vertical axis is average book leverage, calculated by book debt/total assets. 
2 Family-owned firms are defined as firms in which one or several members from the 
same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares (the sample size of 
family owned firms is 29,984). 3. CEO/owner family firms are defined as firms in which 
the CEO is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake 
of at least 5 percent (the sample size of CEO/owner firms is 58,044). 4. CEO family 
succession firms are defined as firms that have experienced at least one CEO succession 
within the family during 1993–2005 (the sample size of CEO family succession firms is 
3,628).
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Figure 3.5 The capital structure of Danish A/S family firms vs. ApS family firms  
Notes: 1. The vertical axis is average book leverage, calculated by book debt/total assets. 
2. A/S (ApS) family-owned firms are defined as those Danish A/S (ApS) firms in which 
one or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of 
outstanding shares (sample size 29,866). 3. A/S (ApS) CEO/owner family firms are 
defined as those Danish A/S (ApS) firms in which the CEO is simultaneously a 
significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent (sample 
size 57,672). 4. A/S (ApS) CEO family succession firms are defined as firms that have 
experienced at least one CEO succession within the family during 1993–2005 (sample 
size 3,603). 
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Figure 3.6 The capital structure of small, medium and large family firms 
Notes: 1. The vertical axis is average book leverage, calculated by book debt/total assets. 
2. Family firms are the sum of all the three subgroups: family-owned firms, CEO/owner 
family firms, and CEO family succession firms, erasing overlapping firms. 3. Small 
family firms are those firms whose size is smaller than or equal to the 33.3rd percentile of 
the size distribution of all the Danish family firms. 4. Medium family firms are those 
firms whose size is greater than the 33.3rd percentile and smaller than or equal to the 
66.7th percentile of the size distribution of all the Danish family firms. 5. Large family 
firms are those firms whose size is greater than the 66.7th percentile of the size 
distribution of all the Danish family firms. 
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Figure 3.7 The capital structure of small, medium and large non-family firms 
Notes: 1. The vertical axis is average book leverage, calculated by book debt/total assets. 
2. Non-family firms are all remaining registered Danish firms that do not fulfill our 
criteria of family firms. 3. Small family firms are smaller than or equal to the 33.3rd 
percentile of the size distribution of all the Danish non-family firms; 4. Medium family 
firms are greater than the 33.3rd percentile and smaller than or equal to the 66.7th 
percentile of the size distribution of all the Danish non-family firms. 5. Large family 
firms are greater than the 66.7th percentile of the size distribution of all the Danish non-
family firms. 
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Figure 3.8 The capital structure of old, middle-age, young, and entrepreneurial family 
firms 
Notes: 1. The vertical axis is average book leverage, calculated by book debt/total assets. 
2. Family firms are the sum of all the three subgroups: family-owned firms, CEO/owner 
family firms, and CEO family succession firms, erasing overlapping firms. 3. Old family 
firms are those established before 1945. 4. Middle-aged family firms are those 
established between 1945 and 1980. 5. Young family firms are those established after 
1980. 6. Entrepreneurial family firms are those established after 1990. 
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Figure 3.9 The capital structure of old, middle-age, young, and entrepreneurial non-
family firms 
Notes: 1. The vertical axis is average book leverage, calculated by book debt/total assets. 
2. Non-family firms are all remaining registered Danish firms that do not fulfill our 
criteria of family firms. 3. Old non-family firms are those established before 1945. 4. 
Middle-aged non-family firms are those established between 1945 and 1980. 5. Young 
non-family firms are those established after 1980. 6. Entrepreneurial non-family firms are 
those established after 1990. 
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Figure 3.11 Leverage evolution from family firms to non-family firms 
Notes: 1. The vertical axis is average book leverage, calculated by book debt/total assets. 2. We 
located 62 single-owner family firms (subgroup of CEO/owner family firms) that experienced an 
ownership transition whereby the family owner sold 100% share to one outside investor rather 
than kept family control, and family succession did not occur thereafter. Thus we believe the 
new owner firm is no longer a family firm. 
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Are Family Firms Better Performers During the Financial Crisis?
Haoyong Zhou*
July 18, 2012 
Abstract
       This paper examines whether family firms are better performers during the global financial 
crisis. Using a dataset covering firms from S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), 
CAC 40 (France), and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) during the period of 2006-2010, I find that broadly 
defined family firms do not outperform non-family firms during the crisis. However, family 
firms with founder presence (as CEO, a board member or a significant blockholder) outperform 
non-family firms by 18 percent in Operating Return on Assets (OROA). Tobin’s Q and risk-
adjusted Alpha of founder firms, by contrast, do not exhibit any difference. I interpret the 
attenuation of the market value premium of founder firms as the result of high volatility of stock 
prices and investors’ overreaction during the crisis (Veronesi, 1999; Glode et al., 2010). Further 
research shows that during the global financial crisis, founder firms invest less and enjoy better 
access to the credit market than non-family firms. My analysis suggests that the superior 
performance of founder firms is largely caused by less incentive to invest in risky projects with a 
high likelihood of failure in order to boost earnings during the crisis. Furthermore, my results 
reveal that founder firms bear the least agency costs, and that Tobin’s Q and Alpha may not be 
the most appropriate measures of corporate performance during the financial crisis. 
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Introduction  
      Family firms constitute a large proportion of national economies around the world. This is 
undeniable (for instance: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer for overall outlook, 1999; 
Anderson and Reeb in the US, 2003; Klein in Germany, 2000; Morck and Yeung in Sweden, 
2003; Bennedsen et al. in Denmark, 2007; Claessens et al. in Eastern Asia, 2000). The 
prevalence of family firms gives rise to the question of whether or not the family firm is a more 
efficient organizational form. Earlier empirical studies offer contradictory conclusions. In the US, 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find that family firms have a lower Tobin’s Q than non-family 
firms, while Anderson and Reeb (2003) report opposite findings. Empirical evidence in other 
countries is mixed and inconclusive (McConaughy et. al., 1998; Morck et al., 2000; Claessens et
al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). 
      More recent studies tend to render the conclusion that the outperformance of family firms is 
sensitive to the definition of family firms (for instance, Maury, 2006; Miller et al., 2007), and 
that the founders of family firms play a central role in differentiating family firms from their 
counterparts in corporate performance. Active involvement of founders in top management 
(CEO) and monitoring as directors of the board is associated with superior corporate 
performance (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Miller et al., 2007). 
      Almost all of the existing literature, however, only focuses on corporate performance 
comparison between family firms and non-family firms in normal economic times or good 
market conditions. Studies are rather scant for periods of depression or recession. It is important 
to re-examine the performance of family firms and non-family firms during recession times 
because conventional economic rules may not be applicable during recession times. For instance, 
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Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2012) report that corporate diversification is valuable to firms 
during a financial crisis (2007-2009), thus challenging the view of diversification discount since 
the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Ampenberger et al. (2008) show that family firms are less 
diversified in unrelated business segments. Therefore, widely-documented outperformance of 
family firms (especially founder-run firms) during normal times may have been diluted through 
the channel of less diversification by family firms in the context of a financial crisis. Secondly, in 
bad times, demand falls from customers and credit constraints increase from financial institutions, 
especially for those firms which largely rely on debt financing; this may amplify intrinsic 
organizational fragility which will be reflected in corporate performance. Lins, Volpin and 
Wagner (2011) argue that the relationship between blockholder control and firm value is more 
pronounced in the financial crisis because of the adjustment to firm value made by the changing 
benefits and costs of blockholding1 during the crisis. Thirdly, Meyer (2011) reports that Private 
Equity (PE) fund-held firms have incurred less losses relative to non-PE-held firms during the 
current financial crisis. Similar to PE-held firms, family firms share the characteristics of 
ownership concentration and intensive board monitoring. It might be interesting to examine 
whether family firms, like PE-held firms, will experience less performance decline during the 
crisis. 
The global financial crisis was heralded by the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy in 2008. This 
offers us an ideal setting for studying corporate performance of family firms versus non-family 

1 On one hand, Blockholders are argued to get better access to internal and external financing (e.g. Wruck (1989), 
Hertzel and Smith (1993), Berglöf and Perotti (1994), Winton (1993), Stein (1997)),  help in product markets 
(Khanna and Palepu (2000)), and offer monitoring (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner 
(1994), Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), Maug (1998), and Kahn and Winton (1998). These benefits may 
become more significant during the financial crisis. On the other hand, controlling blockholders also face a tradeoff 
between using firm funds to extract private benefits and using firm funds to make productive investment. In the 
financial crisis, controlling blockholders’ asset expropriation at the cost of minority shareholders may become more 
serious (e.g. Zingales (1994), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), given that they think private benefits are more 
attractive.  
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firms because, as Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) state, this crisis, differing from 
previous ones, originates from the subprime mortgage crisis (customer finance), which spilled 
over to the corporate domain, and can be viewed as an exogenous shock2. Besides this, the large 
magnitude and global scale of the crisis enable us to conduct an international study rather than a 
regionally based research, such as the studies conducted on the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
(Mitton, 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003).
      Using a detailed dataset from proxy filings of firms from S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 (UK), 
DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France), and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) during the period of 2006-2010, 
I aim to contribute to the existing literature by bringing new evidence from the current global 
financial crisis to bear on the debate whether family firms are an effective organizational form3.
      The second contribution of this paper is to enrich our understanding of the real effects of the 
financial crisis on firms. A growing body of literature reports some significant decreases in 
investment during the crisis (for instance, Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey, 2010; 
Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy, 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). However, all of these studies 
hardly investigate how the impacts of the crisis on corporate performance4 and investment differ 
between family and non-family firms. The results of my paper complement these studies and 
may be of interest to fund managers in portfolio firm screening during recession times. 

2 Bezemer (2009) argues that the current financial crisis is predictable and that “accounting (or flow-of-fund) 
macroeconomic models” can help to anticipate the crisis. He lists 12 economists who warn of unsustainable housing 
debt and the coming of a credit crisis. However, all of these economists only sound the alarm on the mortgage 
market and housing bubbles. They hardly foresee the spillover of the mortgage crisis into the corporate domain. 
Therefore, it appears untrue to regard the current crisis as endogenous.   
3 Alchian (1950), Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) launch the question of why family ownership is not 
dominating if it is indeed a better organizational form.  
4 Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2011) make an international study (excluding US firms) into the relationship between 
bolckholder and firm value during the global financial crisis. Although they only focus on firms with family 
ownership concentration and bypass other family firms like founder-run firms or heir-run firms. My paper 
complements their research by offering a broader analysis on the different types of family firms. US S&P 500 firms 
constitute the major body of the sample and I find results that are different from their findings. 
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      In this paper, I pose two research questions. The primary question is: Do family firms 
outperform non-family firms during the global financial crisis? I find that whether I use the 
market performance measure (Tobin’s Q and Alpha) or the accounting performance measure 
(Operating Return on Assets (OROA)), broadly defined family firms, comprising 35 percent of 
the sample, have not significantly outperformed non-family firms during the crisis. However, 
family firms with active founder involvement (as the CEO, a board member or a significant 
blockholder) show significantly higher accounting performance by 18 percent relative to non-
family firms during the crisis. The Tobin’s Q and risk-adjusted return Alpha of founder firms, by 
contrast, do not exhibit the same significant difference.  
      Next, I explore the reasons for different findings of founder firms in accounting performance 
and market performance. On one hand, OROA computes yearly earnings over the book value of 
the total assets of a firm, which is less likely to be affected by spot stock prices. My results show 
that during the crisis, compared with non-family firms, founder firms invest significantly less 
and have better access to the credit market. Croci, Doukas and Gonenc (2011) find that family 
firms invest less in risky projects and credit markets are more prone to supply family firms with 
long-term debt). Unlike non-family firms, whose managers are arguably myopic and have more 
incentive to over-invest in risky projects to boost current earnings (Andersen and Reeb, 2003) 
under the pressure of managerial dismissal in harsh economic conditions, founder firms are more 
long-term oriented and take a more conservative investment strategy during the crisis. Risky 
projects, especially those financed by short-term debt, are most likely to fail with financial 
constraints. As a result, over-investment with insufficient financing resources lead to project 
failure and further underperformance because of a dry-out of bank loans during the crisis.   
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      On the other hand, market performance is measured as Tobin’s Q and Alpha, which are 
mainly driven by the market price of stocks. High volatility of stock prices features as one 
characteristic of recession times (Veronesi, 1999). In addition, investors are apt to be irrational 
and to overreact to bad market conditions during recession times (Glode et al., 2010). 
Consequently, high volatility and investors’ overreaction may attenuate the value premium of 
founder firms. 
      My empirical evidence suggest that founder firms bear the least agency costs compared with 
other firms during the financial crisis. My results also suggest that during the crisis, when 
inventors tend to be irrational and stock price volatility is high, Tobin’s Q and Alpha may not be 
the most appropriate measures of corporate performance. 
      The remainder of my paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a review of related 
literature. In Section 3, I describe data and variables. In Section 4, I show my empirical findings 
with discussionsand explanations in Section 5. In Section 6, I discuss my findings. Finally, I 
conclude in Section 7. 
2.  Family firms, founder value and the financial crisis
      Family firms have been receiving more attention from academia, policy makers and 
practitioners for at least two reasons:  First, family firms prevail in national economies around 
the world. In the US, for example, family firms comprise one-third of the S&P 500 and account 
for 18 percent of the outstanding shares of the capital market (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
Second, family firms, with ownership concentration in most cases, are a good subject for testing 
finance theories like agency theory (Berle and Mean, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
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key question of family firm research is whether family firms are an effective organizational 
structure to deliver superior performance relative to non-family firms, and which characteristics 
of family firms determine that performance. Earlier literature has mixed and inconclusive results 
regarding this question (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; McConaughy  et al.,1998; Morck et al.,
2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
      Current literature in family business turns to more fine-grained classifications of family firms 
to reconcile the conflicting evidences, and it tends to agree that performance examination is 
sensitive to different definitions of family firms (Maury, 2006). Family firms with active founder 
involvement as the CEO or a board member predict outperformance. Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
show that family ownership can gain value only when the founder acts as the CEO of the family 
business or as the Chairman of the board. Similarly, Miller et al. (2007) make a distinction 
between lone founder businesses where family members of the founder do not involve 
themselves in management or ownership, and true family businesses where family members do. 
The results show that only businesses with a lone founder outperform. By the same token, 
Adams et al. (2009) identify a positive causal effect of founder–CEOs on firm performance, and 
report that founder–CEOs are more likely to step down from the CEO position after periods of 
either unusually low or unusually high operating performances. These research studies suggest a 
positive view of founder value and the necessity of a more fine-grained family firm classification 
when conducting family business research.  
      Although a host of literature centers on the performance examination of family firms vis-à-
vis non-family firms in normal economic times or good market conditions, studies are almost 
missing on what their performance will be like during times of depression or recession. The 
global financial crisis since 2008 gives us an opportunity to address this problem. The extreme 
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market condition (both financial market and product market) during the crisis is more likely to 
amplify various factors that drive the performance of family business, making it unclear whether 
family firms can better handle an exogenous financial crisis on the balance of costs and  benefits 
of family ownership, management and control. 
      On one hand, asset expropriation of minority shareholders by powerful controlling family 
shareholders might be more severe during the crisis, implying that family firms might under-
perform. Unlike small diversified shareholders, who use market value rules to decide 
investments that maximize the value of the firms, large family shareholders, may derive greater 
private benefits from pursuing different investments, excessive compensations, and special 
dividends given their slumping capital incomes during the crisis (Fama and Jensen, 1985; 
Andersen and Reeb, 2003). Baek et al. (2003) document that chaebol firms with concentrated 
shareholding by controlling families had a larger drop in their equity values during the Korean 
financial crisis (1997). Firms with disproportionate ownership structure (voting rights exceed 
cash flow rights) also experience lower returns. Lins, Volpin and Wagner (2011) use a non-US 
dataset consisting of more than 8000 firms from 40 countries to find that family control is 
associated with lower firm valuation globally following a financial shock. In addition, family 
entrenchment and nepotism during the crisis may also hit firm values. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
suggest that one big cost of concentrated family ownership is from the remaining unqualified 
family members who may run the firm. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2007) 
evidence the performance drop of family succession, suggesting a high cost of nepotism and 
unqualified family CEOs. During the crisis, when market conditions are harsh, unqualified 
management may bring more costs to family firms. Using a sample of 800 firms in eight East 
Asian countries during the Eastern Asian financial crisis, Lemmon and Lins (2003) show a 
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significantly lower value of firms with entrenchment managers by 10-20 percent relative to other 
firms5.
        On the other hand, however, superior performance of family firms might arise from the 
better alignment of interests between shareholders and managers in family firms (Andersen and 
Reeb, 2003). Interest conflict between long-term oriented owners and short-term oriented 
managers is highly costly when a crisis comes. For example, it is well known that managers have 
the incentive to take excessively risky projects when a firm is close to bankruptcy, because they 
get the upside gain of the excess risk, but lose nothing from the downside failure. During the 
crisis, this situation is highly likely to happen. Moreover, myopic managers may over-invest in 
projects to boost current performance given falling sales during the crisis. Overinvestment is 
highly risky when financial instruments of the firms are not rich. A dry-out of short-term loans 
from banks with increasingly stringent lending policy might plague ongoing projects. Family 
firms with large shareholders as managers do not have such a problem. Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) document that founder-CEO firms, free from owner-manager conflict of interests, have 
the highest Tobin’s Q among all of the different types of family firms they have categorized. 
Another source of outperformance during the crisis might relate to the reputational concerns of 
family owners with a long-term commitment to family firms. Chen et al. (2010) find that family 
firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts. They interpret the findings as the 
family owners’ willingness to forgo tax benefits to avoid the potential penalty and reputational 
damage from an Internal Revenue Service audit. They also find that firms in need of external 
capital would exhibit even lower tax aggressiveness. Andersen and Reeb (2003) argue that banks 

5 Asian firms are known for a bad corporate governance with a weak legal protection of their investors. Although 
Baek et al. (2003) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) give evidences of family ownership underperformance in Asian 
countries during the regional financial crisis in 1997, it is doubtable whether these results can apply to firms in 
Western countries with a better corporate governance and institutional  environment. 
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or other financial institutions are more likely to deal with the same governing entities and 
practices like those in family firms with reputational concerns than in non-family firms. Croci, 
Doukas and Gonenc (2011) evidence that credit markets are more prone to supply family firms 
with long-term debt. During the crisis, when most firms encounter credit constraints, the 
established relationship with financial institutions could enhance the operating performance of 
the firms that do not forgo good investments because of financing problem.  
      To sum up, whether family firms outperform non-family firms in the financial crisis remains 
an open empirical question. In the following sections, I will provide empirical evidences to 
investigate this question.
3.  Data and variables 
3.1 Sample and sources of data 
     The sample consists of a panel of 3,286 firm-year observations, representing 658 firms from 
S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB  40 (Italy) 
with accounting data from 2006 to 2010. These firms play a vital role in the Western 
industrialized economies. The primary industries of the sample firms span 61 different two-digit 
SIC codes. Noticing the turnover of the index firms each year during the period of 2006-2010, I 
only include those index firms in the 2011 lists, even though some of them may not stand in the 
index lists in a particular year6.

6 I will discuss the problem of survival bias in Section 4.6. 
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      My data collection process comprises three main phases. In the first phase, I compile a 
dataset to identify blockholders (big shareholders with at least 5 percent of the outstanding 
shares), board members and top management for each sample firm. I later use the dataset to 
define family firms. Bureau van Dijk Orbis was the source of the ownership and board data, 
which covers as many as 78.4 million private and public firms (in 2011) from all over the world. 
It provided a historical ownership structure alongside information on the board members and top 
managers of each of the sample firms.  
      In the second phase, I manually collect information on the founding history of each firm from 
the following sources: (1) company official website; (2) Hoover’s; and (3) web searches on the 
firm’s history and family running history. I use the collected information to identify the founders, 
founding families and family member relationships to further define the family firms.  
      The last phase is to merge the information from the first two phases with accounting data 
from COMPUSTAT and other firm characteristic data (firm age data was from Bureau van Dijk 
Orbis, and market value as well as stock return data were from Datastream and CRSP). Table 1 
describes the definitions of all of the variables in my research.  
[Inset Table 1 here] 
3.2 Definitions of the different types of family firms 
      A key challenge for any analysis regarding family firms is the lack of a widely accepted 
definition7 of what a family firm is (Bennedsen et al., 2010). Previous work has shown that the 
results of empirical studies are highly sensitive to the choice of the family firm definition (Maury, 
2006; Miller et al., 2007). Taking this into account, I manage to incorporate a broad definition of 

7Miller et al. (2007) give a comprehensive review ofvarious definitions of family firms.
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family firms into my research, and then scrutinize the possible difference across various types of 
family firms with my findings. Specifically, my approach of definition covers the following 4 
types of family firms:  
1. Founder firms, defined as firms in which the founder/founders of the firms holds/hold a 
position/positions as a board member, CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent 
share holding).
2. Heir firms, defined as firms in which the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the 
founding family holds/hold a position/positions either as a board member, CEO, or a 
blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). 
3. Family-owned firms, defined as firms in which one individual or several members from 
the same family hold more than 10 percent of the outstanding shares, either directly or 
indirectly, through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family 
controls or owns. 
4. Leader/owner firms, defined as firms in which the CEO or a board member is 
simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 
percent. 
      When identifying founder(s) and heir(s) of a firm, following Villalonga and Amit (2006), I 
search from at least two sources of public information. The founder(s) may have founded either 
one sample firm or a predecessor firm of a sample firm. I regard founder(s) as the people 
responsible for the firm’s early growth and development. Therefore, large owners taking control 
of a firm through a spin-off or a leveraged buyout are not founders in my definition.  
      When identifying large family firm investors in defining family-owned firms, following 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), I exclude investment management company investors, such as 
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Fidelity (founded and controlled by Edward Johnson and his daughter, Abigail), or Franklin 
Resources (founded and controlled by brothers Charles and Rupert Johnson), whose funds act as 
large institutional investors in the sample firms. I disregard these funds as large family firm 
investors because the ultimate owners of these funds are a widely dispersed base of diversified 
investors, not the investment management companies per se.
3.3 Measure of firm performance 
      Following earlier studies, I mean to investigate both market performance and accounting 
performance of family versus non-family firms during the financial crisis. I use Tobin’s Q as the 
chief market performance measure8 and interpret it as a measure of firm value. In my setting, 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the 
book value of the total liability (the book value of the total assets – the book value of the equity) 
divided by the book value of the total assets at the end of the fiscal year. The market value of the 
equity is from Datastream, and the book values of the total assets and the equity are from 
COMPUSTAT. I use Operating Return on Assets (OROA) as an accounting performance 
measure. It is Earnings before Interests and Taxes (EBIT) divided by the book values of the total 
assets. Both EBIT and the book value of the total assets are from COMPUSTAT. OROA is a 
natural measure of firm performance because it acts as a comprehensive proxy for a firm’s cash 
flow before interest and taxes relative to its book asset, the earning generator (Bennedsen et al.,
2007). Unlike a net income-based measure like Return on Assets (ROA), it is unaffected by the 
variation of capital structure, which determines a corporate tax base. Unlike return on equity 
(ROE), it captures the total assets rather than part of it. 

8As an alternative measure of market performance, I also use Alpha from Fama and the French Three Factor Model 
to take into account market risks. I discuss this issue in Section 4.5.
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3.4 Descriptive statistics 
      Table 2 shows the two-digit SIC industry distribution of the sample firms. As the main 
findings of this paper center on family firms and founder firms, I only list family firms (column 
4), founder firms (column 5), and non-family firms (column 6) in this table.  Although family 
firms are prevalent in national economy, they are not symmetrically distributed in every industry. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) report that family firms are not present in 13 two-digit SIC 
industries, and that they are over-represented in some industries. In my sample, I find 11 two-
digit SIC industries that are free of family firms. My results of industry representation of family 
firms are comparable to the findings of Villalonga and Amit (2006) as well as Anderson and 
Reeb (2003). In addition, founder firms are concentrated in industries such as electronic and 
other electrical equipment (two-digit SIC code: 36), as well as business service (two-digit SIC 
code: 73). These results imply that controlling for industries matters to an econometric analysis. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
      Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables of the sample firms during 
the crisis year 2008. All of the ratio variables are winsorized at 1 percentile and 99 percentile. I 
have concentrated my focus on family firms, founder firms, and non-family firms. Please refer to 
Appendix 3 for the details of the other subgroups of the family firms.  
      Family firms constitute 35 percent of the sample, which is highly consistent with the findings 
of Villalonga and Amit (2006, 37 percent) as well as Andersen and Reeb (2003, 35 percent). On 
average, family firms and founder firms are significantly smaller and less leveraged at  1 percent 
level relative to non-family firms. The results are consistent with those of Ampenberger et al.
(2011) as well as Villalonga and Amit (2006). Less leverage may imply adverse risk 
characteristics of the family firms. However, family firms and founder firms invest more and 
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expend more significantly at 1 percent level. More importantly, founder firms exhibit more 
difference relative to non-family firms in their number of employees, firm age, research expense, 
as well as depreciation and amortization. These findings suggest that founder firms are younger 
firms with fewer employees, and that they are concentrated in high tech industries, which require 
intensive research and development investment. In terms of dependent variables OROA and 
Tobin’s Q, I find that founder firms have significantly higher values compared with non-family 
firms in Tobin’s Q, while they do not in accounting performance OROA. The data thus suggest 
that at the beginning of the crisis, family firms as a whole do not outperform non-family firms 
with respect to Tobin’s Q and OROA. However, founder firms, a subgroup of family firms, are 
better performers in market value, but not in operating profitability. Earlier I argue that the 
financial crisis has had a significant impact on the real economy since 2009. The fiscal year 
choice (2008) may explain the different performance of the founder firms in OROA and Tobin’s 
Q relative to the non-family firms. Appendix 3 evidences that all of the other non-founder family 
firms: heir firms, family-owned firms and leader/owner firms do not exhibit performance 
superiority relative to non-family firms in both OROA and Tobin’s Q. These findings are 
consistent with those of Miller et al. (2007), suggesting a founder firms’ value premium. In the 
next section, I will use multiple regressions to analyze the performance difference between 
family firms and non-family firms in a 5 year panel framework, which spans the period before 
and during the crisis, controlling for country, industry, and firm specific characteristics.
[Insert Table 3 here] 
74 

4.Do family firms outperform non-family firms in the financial crisis? 
      The principal objective of this paper is to examine whether family firms outperform non-
family firms during the global financial crisis, and investigate the reasons for any possible 
outperformance. In this section, I will use several methods to show the main empirical results 
and to answer any related questions.  
4.1 Univariate difference in difference analysis 
      I start my analysis with univariate difference in  difference test of OROA, and Tobin’s Q. 
Again, I list the 2 performance measures of non-family firms, family firms and founder firms 
before and during the crisis in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 here] 
      My first step focuses on a comparison between all of the family firms and the non-family 
firms. I find that both the accounting performance and the market performance are not 
significantly different except for the two-year-mean of Tobin’s Q before the crisis (2006-2007). 
The performance change across the crisis for family firms and non-family firms are similar. 
These results imply that my broadly defined family firm group does not consist of superior 
performers during the financial crisis.  
      Next, I focus on the comparison between the founder firms and the non-family firms. With 
respect to their accounting performance OROA, the first striking result is that even during the 
crisis, founder firms’ OROA does not drop significantly when compared with their performance 
before the crisis. To be specific, the three-year-mean of OROA before the crisis is 0.116 versus 
0.111 for the two-year-mean during the crisis. By contrast, non-family firms during the crisis 
have a profitability shrink by 14 percent, while all family firms experience a 12 percent shrink. 
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Additionally, founder firms significantly outperform non-family firms during the crisis by 16 
percent, and the change in performance before and during the crisis is also significantly different 
at 10 percent level. The findings provide the first evidence of the founder firms’ outperformance 
during the crisis. 
      The picture of Tobin’s Q is somehow different. Although founder firms significantly 
outperform non-family firms, both before and during the crisis, the magnitude of outperformance 
decreases when the crisis shocks the firms. Prior to the crisis, founder firms outperform non-
family firms by 0.607 in Tobin’s Q. During the crisis, however, founder firms only outperform 
by 0.380, which suggests that the financial crisis reduces the market value premium of the 
founder firms. I notice that in the case of the accounting performance OROA, the crisis tends to 
amplify the performance difference between founder firms and non-family firms from 0.005 
(before the crisis) to 0.015 (during the crisis). The difference of OROA and Tobin’s Q in 
magnitude change implies that the financial crisis may have a disparate effect on corporate cash 
flow based performance and market value based performance. I use multivariate regressions to 
scrutinize the difference in the next sub-section. 
4.2 Firm fixed effect estimation 
      First, I use a firm fixed effect model to test whether family firms outperform non-family 
firms during the crisis. The econometric model is as follows9:
'
0 0 1 1 2* (1)it i t t it i itY Family Crisis Crisis X u e        

9Following earlier research studies, I define the variables iFamily , iFounder iHeir , _ iFamily owned  and 
_ iLeader owner  as a time invariant variable, indicating persistent family ownership, management and control. 
Because firm fixed effects absorb all firm level time-invariant effects, I drop the variable iFamily from my fixed 
effect model.The firm fixed effect specification is also supported by the Hausman test.
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      Where itY  is performance measure, referring to OROA or Tobin’s Q. iFamily is a dummy 
which equals one if one firm is a family firm. tCrisis   is a dummy, denoting either Crisis_acc,
which equals one if the fiscal year is 2009 or 2010, or Crisis_mkt, which equals one if the fiscal 
year is 2008, 2009 or 2010. Crisis_acc is used with OROA and Crisis_mkt is used with Tobin’s 
Q10. *i tFamily Crisis is an interaction variable. 0  is the coefficient of interest. iu is the firm 
fixed effect, and ite  is an error term. 
'
1itX   is a vector of the lagged control variables
11. Following 
Andersen and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006), as well as Miller et al. (2007), I 
incorporate several control variables into my model: Firm size is the natural logarithm of the 
book value of the total assets. Growth opportunities and advertising expense12 are measured as 
research and development expenses over sales and advertising expense over sales respectively. 
Return volatility, the proxy for firm risk, is calculated as the standard deviation of the monthly 
stock returns for the last 36 months. Capital structure is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Investment is the capital expenditure over the plant, property and equipment (PPE) at the end of 
the last fiscal year. I also include the firms’ age, and natural logarithm of number of employees.  
      Table 5 illustrates that after controlling for firm fixed effects and time-variant firm specific 
characteristics, family firms, as broadly defined in the sample, do not significantly outperform 
non-family firms during the crisis. The insignificance is similar whether I use OROA or Tobin’s 
Q as a performance measure and is consistent with early univariate analysis. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 

10 The financial crisis hits the capital market and real economy at different time. Please refer to Table 1 for 
clarification.
11I use lagged control variables to control for contemporary feedback effects between the dependent variables and 
the control variables.
12 Following Millers et al., I code missing data as 0, because public corporations have to report significant 
expenditures by law. 
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      Next, I split the family firms into 4 subgroups and introduce 4 dummies to the fixed effect 
model. I aim to examine whether different groups perform differently during the crisis. The 
model I use is as follows: 
1 0 1 2
'
3 4 1 5
* *
_ * _ * (2)
it t i t i t
i t i t it i it
Y Crisis Founder Crisis Heir Crisis
Family owned Crisis Leader owner Crisis X u e
   
  
    
   
      Where itY  is a performance measure, referring to OROA or Tobin’s Q. iFounder iHeir
_ iFamily owned and _ iLeader owner are dummies which equal one if one firm is a founder firm, 
heir firm, family-owned firm and leader/owner firm respectively. tCrisis   is a dummy, denoting 
either Crisis_acc, which equals one if the fiscal year is 2009 or 2010, or Crisis_mkt, which 
equals one if the fiscal year is 2008, 2009 or 2010. * ,i tFounder Crisis * ,i tHeir Crisis
_ * ,i tFamily owned Crisis and _ *i tLeader owner Crisis are interaction variables. 1  to 4 are the 
coefficients of interest. ' 1itX   is the same vector of the lagged control variables as in model (1). 
iu is the firm fixed effect. ite  is an error term.
      Table 6 exhibits disparate pictures for both the accounting performance OROA and the 
market performance Tobin’s Q. Only founder firms show a significantly superior performance in 
OROA during the financial crisis, while they do not in Tobin’s Q. In the case of OROA, the 
positive coefficient of Founder is significant at 5 percent level. It means on average, that founder 
firms outperform non-family firms by 2 percent OROA during the crisis. The magnitude of 
outperformance accounts for as high as 18 percent of the mean OROA of non-family firms in 
2009 and 2010. In contrast, when controlling for the firm fixed effects and other time-varying 
factors, founder firms do not exhibit a significant value premium, measured in Tobin’s Q during 
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the crisis. These results complement the works of Andersen and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and 
Amit (2006), Maury (2006), as well as Miller et al. (2007) by providing new evidence suggesting 
that in recession times, the market value premium of founder firms disappears, whereas their 
accounting performance premium persists. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.3 Endogeneity of founder status and other robustness tests 
      Although fixed effect estimation controls for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity, 
time-variant heterogeneity may bias the estimates. Founder status is not randomly assigned to 
sample firms. I am unable to identify an unbiased and consistent estimator, given the underlying 
omitted determinants of selection into founder firms are correlated with outcome performances. I
adopt Instrument Variable (IV) 2SLS estimation to tackle this issue.  
      The first step is to run an OLS regression of the founder status on an instrument variable with 
various controls used for the second stage regression: 
'
2 0 1 (3)i i i iFounder Old firm X e     
      A valid instrument should be strongly correlated with the endogenous dummy Founder, 
while it is uncorrelated with the error term of the second stage regression. The instrument I use is 
Old firm, which is one if a firm is incorporated before 1960. Fahlenbrach (2009) first introduces 
this instrument13 to analyze a founder-CEO effect on investment and stock market performance. 
A firm set up before 1960 is most unlikely to have its founder(s) present at the firm given the 
average age of founder firms is 29 in my sample. When the instrument is strongly correlated with 

13Fahlenbrach uses 1940 as a threshold of old firms. However, his sample period is from 1995 to 2002. In my case, I 
use 1960 since my sample period is from 2006 to 2010. 
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founder firms, it has a slim chance of affecting the operating performance beyond the control 
variables in the second stage regression.
      In the second stage, we use the predicted values of Founder from the first stage regression to 
replace the dummy Founder and then regress the firm performance on predicted Founder and 
control variables: 
 '
3 2 3 (4)OROA i i iY Founder X e     
      Where OROAY  is the difference between the average OROA from the period of 2009-2010 and 
the average OROA from the period of 2006-2008. iFounder  is a dummy which equal one if one 
firm is a founder firm, heir firm, family-owned firm and leader/owner firm respectively. 2  is the 
coefficient of interest. 'iX  is a vector of control variables. The control variables are also the 
difference between the average of the period of 2009-2010 and the average of the period of 
2006-2008. These control variables include firm size, growth opportunities, advertising expense, 
firm risk, capital structure, firm age, and number of employees.  ie is an error term. 
      In Table 7, the first-stage regression shows that Founder is strongly negatively related to Old 
firms (the coefficient is as high as -0141, significant at 1 percent level), implying the legitimacy 
of the instrument. In the second stage regression, the coefficient of Founder is 0.059, which is 
significant at a 10 percent level. The finding is consistent with that of the former fixed effect 
model. Taken together, the results of IV 2SLS estimation confirm the outperformance of founder 
firms in OROA during the crisis.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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      As an alternative robustness test14, I exclude financial firms from the sample and re-run the 
firm fixed effect regressions. The results are consistent with those of the full sample. The 
magnitude of the coefficient of interest highly resembles that from the full sample estimation 
(Please refer to column 1 in Appendix 4 for details).  
4. 4 Cross-country tests 
In this sub-section, I consider whether country-level characteristics (for example, legal 
protection of shareholders, corporate governance systems and other institutional environments) 
add explanatory power to our findings. 
      I first divide the sample into Anglo-Saxon and Continental European groups by the legal 
origin (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) of the stock exchange country of 
a sample firm (in the sample, US S&P 500 and UK FTSE 100 firms are categorized into the 
Anglo-Saxon group and the rest of the sample is added to the Continental European group). The 
results (not reported for brevity) show that a founder premium in OROA is only significant in the 
Anglo-Saxon group, while Tobin’s Q of the founder firms is not significantly different from non-
family firms whether I use the Anglo-Saxon or the Continental European sample. The latter is 
consistent with the case in the full sample.  
Next, I split the sample by US and non-US firms and find that the results are highly 
consistent with those in the first split of the sample above. Only US firms exhibit a founder 
premium in OROA (refer to column 2 in Appendix 4). Considering that 82 percent of the 
founder firms are US firms and that the US firms constitute a large body of the sample, I 
conclude that the US founder firms mainly contribute to the explanatory power of my findings.  

14 I also use pooled OLS to check the outperformance of the founder firms in OROA, using the full sample. The 
results are highly consistent with those of the fixed effect estimation (for brevity not reported).  
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4.5 Alternative measure of market performance 
I am aware of the inconsistent findings from the regression of Tobin’s Q with those from the 
OROA. Founder firms do not outperform during the crisis in Tobin’s Q, but in OROA. 
Numerous literature reports high volatility (for example, Veronesi, 1999) of stocks during 
recession times, thus indicating a high risk in financial markets. High market risk during the 
crisis is likely to affect the volatility and the return of individual stock prices. Therefore, using 
non-risk-adjusted Tobin’s Q as a market performance measure may be problematic.  
      To exclude common market risks from the individual stock performance, I calculate 
annualized monthly risk-adjusted performance estimates (Alpha) and use Alphas as an 
alternative measure of market performance to replace Tobin’s Q and re-run the fixed effect 
regressions. Following Carhart (1997) as well as Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009)15, I use a two-
stage estimation procedure to obtain a panel of monthly Alphas. In the first stage, for each month, 
I regress the excess returns of individual stock on the Fama and French (1993) 3 risk factors16
over the past 5 years to obtain betas. If less than 5 years of previous data is available for a 
specific stock-month, I required the stock to be present in the sample for at least 48 months in the 
past 5 years. In the second stage, I estimate a stock’s monthly Alpha as the difference between 
the stock’s excess return and the realized risk premium, defined as the vector of betas times the 

15 I focus on US firms because I want to ensure that my estimates of Alphas from the Fama and French three factor 
model are free from cross country heterogeneity.  
16 The regression equation is:
1 2 3( )i f m fR r Alpha R r SM B H LM         where i fR r is the excess 
return of stock i, fr is the risk-free return rate, and mR is the return of the whole stock market. m fR r is the 
market excess return. SMB stands for "small (market capitalization) minus big" and HML for "high (book-to-market 
ratio) minus low"; they measure the historic excess returns of small caps over big caps and of value stocks over 
growth stocks. These three factors are historical data and available from Kenneth French’s homepage: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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vector of the three factors. Finally, for each stock, I take an average of 12 monthly Alphas to get 
annualized monthly Alphas.
Table 9 shows the results of the fixed effect estimation using Model (2) with Alpha as a 
dependent variable. The findings are highly consistent with those found in the case of Tobin’s Q 
as a market performance measure. Neither broadly-defined family firms nor founder firms 
outperform relative to non-family firms in Alpha.  In Section 5, I will scrutinize the reasons for 
the attenuation of the market value premium of founder firms during the crisis.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4.6 Do surviving firms bias estimation? 
The sample covers firms standing in the list of S&P 500, FTSE 100, DAX 30, CAC 40 and 
FTSE MIB 40 in 2011. This means that those firms all survived the crisis period of 2006 - 2010. 
They are presumably superior performers in the market. Turnover of index firms is common. 
Focusing only on those survivors may bias the estimation. 
      To address this concern, I restrict the sample to those firms which are consistently present in 
the S&P 500 index in each year (389 firms) through the period of 2006 - 201017 and re-run the 
regressions using model (2) with Tobin’s Q, Alpha and OROA as dependent variables. The 
results in Appendix 5 are in consistence with those of the full sample.  
      I summarize this section by stating that when the financial crisis comes, broadly defined 
family firms are not superior performers. Only founder firms outperform other firms during the 
crisis in terms of OROA. However, the market value premium of founder firms, which is widely 

17 I only use US firms for this robustness test, because US firms mainly contribute to the explanatory power of the 
findings.  
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documented in normal or good economic times in earlier studies, disappears. I will explain these 
phenomena in the next section.  
5.  Why do founder firms outperform in operating profitability, but not in market 
valuation?
      I start to explain the different performance of founder firms with respect to OROA and 
Tobin’s Q/Alpha during the financial crisis by analyzing the different algorithms of these two 
measures. OROA is a period cash flow divided by the book value of the total assets at the end of 
a fiscal year. Therefore, it is a revenue based profitability measure driven by business strategy, 
operating efficiency, management skills, expense control and other firm level characteristics. On 
the contrary, Tobin’s Q is computed as a market value over the book value of the total assets.  
Since the book value of a firm is persistent, Tobin’s Q is mainly driven by the market price of 
stocks (I use the book value of the total liability of debt plus the market value of the stocks as a 
proxy for the market value of the total assets). By the same token, Alpha, though excluding the 
effect of market risks, is also determined by the individual stock price. A large body of financial 
literature documents a high volatility of stock returns in recession times (for example, Veronesi, 
1999). Table 8 clearly evidences that during the crisis, volatility of monthly return is as high as 
12 percent, while it is only 6 percent in normal times. Economists tend to attribute high volatility 
to investors’ uncertainty about the future growth of an economy in bad times. In addition, 
investors are prone to be irrational and they overreact to bad market conditions during recessions 
(Glode et al., 2010).  In my context, I argue that in the recent financial crisis, high volatility 
tends to attenuate a value premium of founder firms because of investors’ overreacting to bad 
market condition by underestimating valuable stocks. Univariate difference in the difference 
analysis in Table 4 also supports my argument. Before the crisis the market value premium of 
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founder firms is 0.607, and then during the crisis it declines to 0.380, revealing a reduction of 35 
percent. Moreover, market value drops before and during the crisis to 0.449 for non-family firms 
versus 0.664 for founder firms. Return volatility for founder firms during the crisis year 2008 is 
0.112, significantly higher than non-family firms (0.098) in Table 3. I therefore ascribe the 
vanishing of the founder firm market value premium to investors’ irrational overreaction to bad 
market conditions and high volatility during the crisis time.  
      Next, I explore the reasons for the outperformance of founder firms in the accounting 
measure OROA during the crisis. I use a fixed effect model to investigate other financial and 
investment strategy differences between founder firms and non-family firms, which may also 
affect accounting performance. I test the difference in capital structure, , and investment (the 
ratio of capital expenditure to PPE) between the founder firms and the non-family firms, 
controlling for other variables18.  Table 10 presents the results. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
      I find that founder firms invest significantly less (at a 5 percent level) relative to non-family 
firms during the crisis. At the same time, however, founder firms have gained more debt and 
their aggregate level of debt is higher than the non-family firms. The coefficient of 
Founder*crisis_acc in the second column means that on average, the capital structure of founder 
firms is more leveraged by 0.9 relative to non-family firms (significant at  10 percent level). 
Recalling Table 3’s descriptive statistics, before the crisis19  founder firms are less leveraged and 
invest significantly more relative to non-family firms. The coefficients indicate that founder 
firms substantially change their investment and financial strategy during the crisis. I also find 

18 For the regression of investment, I follow Elull et al. (2010) to choose the control variables. For the regression of 
the capital structure and the short-term debt change, I follow Antoniou et al. (2008) to choose the control variables.
192008 is viewed as before the crisis for accounting performance examinations.
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that the cash flow and the working capital of the founder firms are similar to those of the non-
family firms20. If I assume that a higher leverage means better access to the credit market, the 
fact that the founder firms raise their debt level during the crisis suggests that they have more 
debt financing resources than non-family firms in bad times, when financial institutions tighten 
their credit granting activities. Previous studies (Morck et al., 1988, 2000; Fahlenbrach, 2009, 
etc.)?argue that founders bring differentially valuable skills to firms. “Founders may be inspiring 
leaders, great visionaries, or exceptionally talented scientists.” (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). My 
findings suggest that in addition to the above mentioned skills, founders are able to obtain more 
financing resources, leading firms to survive times of recession. By contrast, it is widely 
documented that non-family firm managers are myopic and have more incentive to take on risky 
projects to boost current earnings (Andersen and Reeb, 2003). The incentive is even more 
intensified under the pressure of managerial dismissal in harsh economic conditions. In contrast, 
founder firms are more long-term oriented and take a conservative investment strategy during the 
crisis. Risky projects, especially those financed by short-term debt, are most likely to fail with 
financial constraints. As a result, desperate over-investment during the crisis may lead to project 
failure and further underperformance because of a dry-out of bank loans during the crisis.   
      In summary, the results show that during the financial crisis, founder firms make a more 
conservative investment strategy even though they may get better access to the credit market 
than their counterparts. Less incentive of founder firms to over-invest in risky projects to boost 
current earnings during the crisis explain their outperformance. On the other hand, because 
market performance is mainly driven by stock prices, high volatility of stock returns and 

20I also test the difference in working capital and cash between the founder firms and the non-family firms to 
examine their short-term financing instruments change, which may affect their operating performance.  However, I 
do not find significant differences.
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investors’ overreaction to bad market prevail during the crisis, the market value premium of 
founder firms may be diluted.  
6. Discussion 
The primary finding of this paper is that only founder firms are better performers in operating 
profitability (OROA). The other three types of family firms do not exhibit a significant 
difference relative to the non-family firms.  What mechanism drives the discrepancy among 
founder firms and the other family firms? The founders of firms enjoy supreme and unchallenged 
authority and respect. They are long-visioned, highly talented, and inspiring entrepreneurs 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In most cases, they are CEOs, decision makers, and large 
shareholders of the firms. To keep a sustainable growth for their young firms, founders are more 
likely to take a long-term-oriented strategy to helm their firms. Due to their unparalleled status in 
the firms, founders do not desperately take extra risky projects to boost current earnings to please 
board members, when the stock prices of the firms slump during the crisis. In contrast, 
professional CEOs in non-family firms would have more incentive to take more risks to inflate 
the revenue and maintain their positions. Heir firms are very similar to non-family firms. After 
several generations, the firms with strong family characteristics in their early stages gradually 
develop into professionally-managed firms. The previous characteristics of family firms fade 
away. Descriptive statistics in Appendix 4 demonstrate that heir firms closely resemble non-
family firms in most of the dimensions. The chances are that the CEO in an heir firm is a non-
founding family member. Therefore, heir firms are likely to suffer from the same myopic 
investment strategy to boost current earnings. The case of family-owned firms and leader/owner 
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firms is another picture. Unlike founder firms, which are new enterprises, family-owned and 
leader/owner firms are mature corporations. The controlling family or individual may not 
necessarily come from the founding family that focused on the growth opportunities during the 
early stages of the firm. When the crisis comes, however, large shareholding in the firm incurs 
huge capital income loss with the drop of stock prices. In this context, the controlling family or 
individual has more incentive than founders to boost short-term earnings to rapidly recover loss 
in the capital market at the cost of the small shareholders. Consequently, the family-owned firms 
and leader/owner firms underperform the founder firms.  
      Earning management is another concern when founder firms only outperform in OROA. 
Superiority of accounting performance is arguably attributable to the manipulation of earnings. 
This argument is implausible, because founder firms are less leveraged before the crisis (Table 3) 
and have less incentive to manipulate earnings to lobby banks to supply loans. It is financially 
distressful non-family firms that are more prone to conduct earning management. Even though 
non-family firms are more apt at manipulating earnings, founder firms are still better performers. 
In addition, US firms mainly contribute to the findings. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998) rank the US as one of the countries with the best investor protection and legal 
environment. This sample consists of the biggest public firms. Information transparency is 
demanding; internal and external audits are stringent. Earning management has a slim chance to 
be the main driving force of outperformance.  
      Last, Villalonga and Amit (2006) argue that founder-CEO firms bear less agency costs than 
classical owner-manager firms in normal economic conditions. My paper provides new evidence 
in recession times to consolidate their argument, by evidencing that founder firms bear the least 
agency costs among non-family firms and the different types of family firms. My paper also 
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suggests that during the crisis, because the capital market is more risky and investors are highly 
overreacting, stock prices are remarkably noisy and do not reflect the intrinsic value of a firm, 
and that stock-based performance measures like Tobin’s Q and Alpha, may not be the most 
appropriate measures of a firm’s market performance. Further research will center on the testing 
of volatility-adjusted measures like Sharp Ratio.   
7. Concluding remarks 
      It is the prevalence of family firms all over the world that makes academics pay increasing 
attention to family business research. One central issue is to examine whether family firms are a 
superior organizational form. Although a growing body of literature has made rigorous 
performance analyses between family firms and non-family firms in normal or good economic 
times, rather scant papers try to investigate the topic in recession times. This paper attempts to 
fill this knowledge void.  
      Constructing a detailed dataset from proxy filings of firms from S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 
(UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) from 2006 to 2010, I aim 
at contributing to the literature by providing new evidence to conduct a performance examination 
between family firms and non-family firms during the global financial crisis since the Lehman 
Brother’s bankruptcy in 2008.
      I find that family firms, broadly defined as the sum of founder firms, heir firms, family-
owned firms and leader/owner firms, comprise 35 percent of the sample. They do not 
significantly outperform non-family firms during the crisis whether I use market value measures 
(Tobin’s Q/Alpha) or an accounting profitability measure (OROA). However, founder firms, as a 
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subgroup of family firms significantly outperform non-family firms by 18 percent in OROA 
during the crisis. Tobin’s Q/Alpha of founder firms, by contrast, does not exhibit a difference 
significantly. My interpretation of this phenomenon is that Tobin’s Q/Alpha is mainly driven by 
stock prices. High volatility and investors’ overreaction during the crisis (Veronesi, 1999; Glode 
et al., 2010) may attenuate the market value premium of founder firms. 
      Further testing shows that during the crisis, relative to non-family firms, founder firms invest 
significantly less and have better access to the credit market. I ascribe the outperformance of 
founder firms to less incentive to over-invest in risky projects with a high probability of failure 
under financial constraints to boost current earnings during the crisis. 
      Taken as a whole, my results support a widely-documented “founder premium” (for instance, 
Morck et al., 1988, 2000; Fahlenbrach, 2009). Founders not only bring valuable skills in normal 
economic times, but also enable firms to weather the financial crisis with better expense control, 
more financial resource and a conservative investment strategy. My results suggest that agency 
costs in founder firms are the least relative to other firms during recession times. The results also 
suggest that when inventors tend to be irrational and stock price volatility is high, Tobin’s Q and 
Alpha may not be the most appropriate measures of corporate performance.  
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Table 1 Variable definitions 

21The bankruptcy of Lehman Brother in September 22, 2008 signals the coming of the global financial crisis. The 
financial market reacts immediately to the event of bankruptcy and stock prices slump. Appendix 1 evidences this 
picture. I therefore define the market crisis years as 2008, 2009 and 2010.  However, the reaction of the real 
economy lags behind the financial market. The crisis has had a significant effect on the real economy since 2009, 
which is supported by the national GDP growth rate in Appendix 2. So I define the accounting crisis years as 2009 
and 2010.
Variables  Definition 
Crisis_acc The accounting crisis year, a dummy variable which is one if the 
fiscal year is 2009 or 2010. This variable indicates the years when 
the financial crisis significantly strikes the real economy21.
Crisis_mkt The market crisis year, a dummy variable which is one if the fiscal 
year is 2008, 2009 or 2010. This variable indicates the years when 
the financial crisis significantly strikes the financial market.  
Family A dummy variable, which is one if the sample firm is a family firm. 
Family firms are the sum of all of the four subgroups of firms: (1) 
founder firms; (2) heir firms; (3) family-owned firms; and (4) 
Leader/owner firms. Please refer to the definitions of the four 
subgroups of family firms below.  
Founder Founder firms, a dummy variable which is one if the 
founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board 
member, or CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share 
holding).
Heir Heir firms, a dummy variable which is one if the heir/heirs (by 
blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm 
holds/hold a position either as a board member, or CEO, or a 
blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). 
Family_owned Family-owned firms, a dummy variable which is one if one 
individual or several members from the same family together hold 
more than 10 percent of the outstanding shares either directly or 
indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual 
or the family controls or owns. 
Leader_owner Leader/owner firms, a dummy variable which is one if the CEO or a 
board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an 
outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. 
OROA Operating Retunes on Assets, defined as earnings before interests 
and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book values of the total assets.
Tobin's Q Market value of equity plus the book value of the total liability 
(book value of total asset - book value of equity) divided by the 
book value of the total assets.
Difference in OROA The difference between average OROA from the period of 2009-
2010 and average OROA from the period of 2006-2008. 
Size Firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the book value of the 
total assets of a firm. 
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                    Table 1, continued 
Capital Structure Debt to equity ratio, defined as the book value of the total liability 
(book value of the total asset - book value of the equity) divided by 
the book value of the total equity.
Investment Ratio of capital expenditure to the Plant, Property and Equipment 
(PPE), defined as capital expenditure divided by the PPE of the last 
fiscal year.
Ln employee Natural logarithm of the number of employees of  the firm. 
ROA Returns on Assets, defined as net income divided by the book value 
of the total assets.  
Working capital growth  Yearly working capital growth rate, defined as an increment of the 
yearly working capital divided by the working capital of the last 
fiscal year.
Short debt change Yearly short-term debt increment, defined as the difference between 
short-term debt this fiscal year and the last fiscal year, measured in 
1 billion US dollars.
Advertising Adverting expense, defined as yearly advertising expense divided 
by sales.  
Research Research and development expense, defined as yearly research and 
development expense divided by sales.  
Firm age The difference between the incorporation year and a fiscal year. 
Return volatility Firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock 
returns for the previous 36 months. 
Ln cash Natural logarithm of cash. 
Sales growth rate Yearly sales growth rate, defined as an increment of the yearly total 
sales divided by the total sales of the last fiscal year.
Tangibility  Tangible assets, defined as the tangible assets divided by the book 
values of the total assets.  
Profitability Lagged OROA, Operating Return on Assets of the last fiscal year. 
Dividend payout Dividend divided by sales. 
Non-debt tax shield Depreciation and amortization divided by the book value of the 
total assets.  
Alpha Annualized average monthly risk-adjusted return of stock. Monthly 
risk-adjusted return is the difference between the monthly before-
expense return and the risk premium, defined as the vector of betas 
times the vector of Fama and French three factors (1993) realized in 
month t. I estimate the betas by a rolling regression following Gil-
Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009).
Old firm A dummy variable, which is one if the sample firm is incorporated 
before 1960.
Sales/asset Ratio of sales to the book value of the total assets. 
Expense/asset Ratio of selling, general administrative expense to the book value of 
the total assets.  
Cost/asset Ratio of costs of goods to the book value of the total assets. 
Depreciation/asset Ratio of depreciation and amortization to the book value of the total 
assets. 
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Table 2 Industry distribution of family firms, founder firms, and non-family firms 
SIC
code
Industry description  Allfirms 
Family
firms 
Founder  
firms 
Non-
family 
firms 
% family 
firms in the 
industry 
% founder  
firms in the 
industry 
10 Metal mining  11 6 1 5 55% 9% 
12 Coal mining 5 0 0 5 0% 0% 
13 Oil and gas extraction  29 10 6 19 34% 21% 
14 Mining and quarrying of nonmetallic 
minerals, except fuels 
   1      0      0     1       0%       0% 
15 General building contractors  6 5 2 1 83% 33% 
16 Heavy construction, except buildings  3 2 0 1 67% 0% 
17 Special trade contractors 1 0 0 1 0% 0% 
20 Food and kindred products  27 14 0 13 52% 0% 
21 Tobacco products  6 2 0 4 33% 0% 
23 Apparel and other textile products  3 1 0 2 33% 0% 
24 Lumber and wood products  2 1 0 1 50% 0% 
25 Furniture and fixtures  2 1 0 1 50% 0% 
26 Paper and allied products  6 0 0 6 0% 0% 
27 Printing and publishing  5 2 0 3 40% 0% 
28 Chemical and allied products  49 16 1 33 33% 2% 
29 Petroleum and coal products  8 2 0 6 25% 0% 
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products  6 2 1 4 33% 17% 
31 Leather and leather products  1 1 0 0 100% 0% 
32 Stone, clay, and glass products  7 4 0 3 57% 0% 
33 Primary metal industries  11 6 2 5 55% 18% 
34 Fabricated metal products  5 0 0 5 0% 0% 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment  24 8 4 16 33% 17% 
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment  37 15 9 22 41% 24% 
37 Transportation equipment  21 6 0 15 29% 0% 
38 Instruments and related products  35 10 2 25 29% 6% 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing products  4 1 0 3 25% 0% 
40 Railroad transportation  3 0 0 3 0% 0% 
42 Trucking and warehousing  1 1 0 0 100% 0% 
44 Water transportation 2 2 0 0 100% 0% 
45 Transportation by air  4 1 1 3 25% 25% 
46 Pipelines, except natural gas 1 0 0 1 0% 0% 
47 Transportation services  5 3 0 2 60% 0% 
48 Communications  29 14 6 15 48% 21% 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services  55 2 0 53 4% 0% 
50 Wholesale trade of durable goods  7 3 1 4 43% 14% 
51 Wholesale trade of nondurable goods  8 2 2 6 25% 25% 
52 Building materials and gardening  3 1 0 2 33% 0% 
53 General merchandise stores  13 7 2 6 54% 15% 
54 Food stores  6 3 0 3 50% 0% 
55 Auto dealers and service stations  3 2 0 1 67% 0% 
56 Apparel and accessory stores  8 4 3 4 50% 38% 
57 Furniture and home furnishings  4 2 2 2 50% 50% 
58 Eating and drinking places  6 1 0 5 17% 0% 
59 Miscellaneous retail  7 3 2 4 43% 29% 
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Table 2, continued 
60 Depository institutions  4 0 0 4 0% 0% 
61 Nondepository institutions  7 1 1 6 14% 14% 
62 Security and commodity brokers  11 3 3 8 27% 27% 
63 Insurance carriers  32 12 6 20 38% 19% 
64 Insurance agents, brokers, services  1 0 0 1 0% 0% 
65 Real estate 1 1 0 0 100% 0% 
67 Holding And Other Investment Offices 48 16 8 32 33% 17% 
70 Hotels and other lodging places  7 4 1 3 57% 14% 
72 Personal services  2 2 2 0 100% 100% 
73 Business services  44 18 13 26 41% 30% 
75 Auto repair, services, and parking 1 0 0 1 0% 0% 
78 Motion pictures 1 1 1 0 100% 100% 
79 Amusement and recreation services 1 1 0 0 100% 0% 
80 Health services  5 0 0 5 0% 0% 
82 Educational services  2 2 2 0 100% 100% 
87 Engineering and management services 10 3 1 7 30% 10% 
95 Admin-Environ Quality, Housing 1 0 0 1 0% 0% 
 Total 658 232 85 426 35% 13% 
Number and percent of firms by primary two-digit SIC code. Family firms are defined as the sum of all of the four subgroups of firms: (1) 
founder firms; (2) heir firms; (3) family-owned firms; and (4) Leader/owner firms. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of 
the firm holds/hold a position as a board member, CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). Heir firms are firms 
where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, CEO, 
or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). Family-owned firms are firms where one individual or several members from the 
same family together hold more than 10 percent of the outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund 
which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a 
significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. The sample comprises 658 firms from S&P 500 (US), 
FTSE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index company lists.  
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Table 5 Performance of family firms vs. non-family firms during the financial crisis 
  Dependent Variable 
  OROA      Tobin's Q  
Crisis_acc -0.001 Crisis_mkt -2.139 ***
(0.018) (0.381)
Family*Crisis_acc 0.005 Family*Crisis_mkt 0.075
(0.004) (0.092)
Size -0.023 *** Size -0.373 ***
(0.008) (0.076)
Capital structure 0.000 Capital structure 0.029 ***
(0.000) (0.010)
Ln employee 0.015 * Ln employee 0.214 * 
(0.009) (0.124)
Investment -0.075 ** Investment -0.516
(0.033) (0.541)
Advertising  -0.583 * Advertising  -4.515
(0.329) (4.149)
Research 0.097 Research 1.622
(0.083) (1.432)
Firm age 0.003 ** Firm age 0.085 ***
(0.001) (0.022)
Return volatility 0.186 *** Return volatility 0.666
(0.061) (0.613)
Size*Crisis_acc -0.001 Size*Crisis_mkt 0.161 ***
(0.002) (0.046)
Capital
structure*Crisis_acc 0.001 ** Capital structure*Crisis_mkt -0.025 ** 
(0.000) (0.011)
Ln employee*Crisis_acc 0.000 Ln employee*Crisis_mkt -0.032
(0.002) (0.044)
Investment*Crisis_acc -0.067 ** Investment*Crisis_mkt -0.734
(0.026) (0.591)
Advertising*Crisis_acc 0.271 *** Advertising*Crisis_mkt 7.622 ***
(0.078) (1.976)
Research*Crisis_acc 0.089 *** Research*Crisis_mkt -0.626
(0.034) (1.203)
Firm age*Crisis_acc 0.000 * Firm age*Crisis_mkt 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Return
volatility*Crisis_acc -0.106 ** Return volatility*Crisis_mkt 0.357
(0.045) (0.297)
_cons 0.136 _cons 1.024
(0.084) (1.242)
Within R-sq 0.144 Within R-sq 0.268
N 2022     N 2022   
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This table reports results of the firm fixed effect model regression of firm performance before and during the financial 
crisis from 2006 to 2010. Family* Crisis_acc is an interaction between the variables Family and Crisis_acc. Crisis_acc 
is a dummy which is one if the fiscal year is 2009 or 2010. This variable indicates the years when the financial crisis 
significantly strikes the real economy. Family*Crisis_mkt is an interaction between the variables Family and 
Crisis_mkt. Crisis_mkt is a dummy which is one if the fiscal year is 2008, 2009 or 2010. This variable indicates the 
years when the financial crisis significantly strikes the financial market. Family is a dummy variable, which is one if 
the sample firm is a family firm. Family firms are the sum of all the four subgroups of firms: (1) founder firms; (2) 
heir firms; (3) family-owned firms; and (4) Leader/owner firms. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders 
of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member,CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). 
Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a 
position either as a board member, CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). Family-owned firms 
are firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of the 
outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family 
controls or owns. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant 
shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. OROA is earnings before interests and taxes 
(EBIT) divided by the book values of the total assets. Tobin’s Q is the market value of the equity plus the book value 
of the total liability (the book value of the total asset – the book value of the equity) divided by the book value of the 
total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of the total assets of a firm. Capital structure is the book 
value of the total liability (the book value of the total asset – the book value of the equity) divided by the book value 
of the total equity. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by the PPE of the last fiscal year. Ln employee is 
natural logarithm of the number of employees of the firm. Advertising is yearly advertising expense divided by sales. 
Research is yearly research and development expense divided by sales. Firm age is the difference between the 
incorporation year and a fiscal year. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of 
stock returns for the previous 36 months. Size*Crisis_mkt (Size*Crisis_acc),               Capital 
Structure*Crisis_mkt(Capital Structure*Crisis_acc), Ln employee*Crisis_mkt (Ln employee*Crisis_acc), 
Investment*Crisis_mkt(Investment*Crisis_acc),Advertising*Crisis_mkt(Advertising*Crisis_acc),Research*Crisis_m
kt(Research*Crisis_acc), Firm age*Crisis_mkt (Firm age*Crisis_acc) and Return volatility*Crisis_mkt (Return 
volatility*Crisis_acc) are interactions between Crisis_mkt (Crisis_acc) and Size, Capital Structure, Ln employee, 
Investment, Advertising, Research, Firm age and Return volatility respectively. The sample comprises 658 firms from 
S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index 
company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10 
percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively.  
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Table 6 Fixed effect estimation of founder firm outperformance in OROA during the crisis 
  Dependent Variable 
  OROA      Tobin's Q  
Crisis_acc -0.001 Crisis_mkt -2.156 ***
(0.018) (0.391)
Founder*Crisis_acc 0.017 ** Founder*Crisis_mkt 0.107
(0.009) (0.177)
Heir*Crisis_acc 0.001 Heir*Crisis_mkt 0.195
(0.006) (0.118)
Family_owned*Crisis_acc 0.001 Family_owned*Crisis_mkt -0.055
(0.007) (0.105)
Leader_owner*Crisis_acc -0.009 leader_owner*Crisis_mkt -0.094
(0.008) (0.127)
Size -0.024 *** Size -0.379 ***
(0.008) (0.077)
Capital structure 0.000 Capital structure 0.030 ***
(0.000) (0.010)
Ln employee 0.016 * Ln employee 0.222 * 
(0.009) (0.125)
Investment -0.068 ** Investment -0.529
(0.031) (0.566)
Advertising  -0.611 * Advertising  -4.585
(0.329) (4.205)
Research 0.120 Research 1.706
(0.082) (1.454)
Firm age 0.003 ** Firm age 0.086 ***
(0.001) (0.022)
Return volatility 0.184 *** Return volatility 0.691
(0.063) (0.624)
Size*Crisis_acc -0.001 Size*Crisis_mkt 0.166 ***
(0.002) (0.047)
Capital structure*Crisis_acc 0.001 ** Capital structure*Crisis_mkt -0.025 ** 
(0.000) (0.011)
Ln employee*Crisis_acc 0.000 Ln employee*Crisis_mkt -0.034
(0.002) (0.046)
Investment*Crisis_acc -0.069 *** Investment*Crisis_mkt -0.685
(0.027) (0.613)
Advertising*Crisis_acc 0.274 *** Advertising*Crisis_mkt 7.676 ***
(0.074) (2.048)
Research*Crisis_acc 0.080 ** Research*Crisis_mkt -0.672
(0.035) (1.195)
Firm age*Crisis_acc 0.000 Firm age*Crisis_mkt 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Return volatility*Crisis_acc -0.108 ** Return volatility*Crisis_mkt 0.348
(0.046) (0.308)
_cons 0.126 _cons 1.021
(0.082) (1.250)
Within R-sq 0.149 Within R-sq 0.270
N 2022     N 2022   
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This table reports results of firm fixed effect model regressions of firm performance before and during the 
financial crisis from 2006 to 2010. Founder*Crisis_acc (Founder*Crisis_mkt), Heir*Crisis_acc (Heir*Crisis_mkt), 
Family_owned*Crisis_acc(Family_owned*Crisis_mkt) and Leader_owner*Crisis_acc (Leader_owner*Crisis_mkt) 
are interactions between dummy variable: Founder, Heir, Family_owned, or Leader_owner and dummy variable: 
Crisis_acc (Crisis_mkt). Crisis_acc is a dummy which is one if the fiscal year is 2009 and 2010. This variable 
indicates the years when the financial crisis significantly strikes real economy. Crisis_mkt is a dummy which is 
one if fiscal year is 2008, 2009 and 2010. This variable indicates the years when the financial crisis significantly 
strikes the financial market. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position 
as a board member,CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). Heir firms are firms where the 
heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board 
member, CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). Family-owned firms are firms where one 
individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of the outstanding shares 
either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or 
owns. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder 
with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. OROA is earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 
divided by the book values of the total assets. Tobin’s Q is the market value of the equity plus the book value of 
the total liability (the book value of the total asset – the book value of the equity) divided by the book value of the 
total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of the total assets of a firm. Capital structure is the book 
value of the total liability (the book value of the total asset – the book value of the equity) divided by the book 
value of the total equity. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by the PPE of the last fiscal year. Ln 
employee is natural logarithm of the number of employees of the firm. Advertising is yearly advertising expense 
divided by sales. Research is yearly research and development expense divided by sales. Firm age is the difference 
between the incorporation year and a fiscal year. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard 
deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. Size*Crisis_mkt (Size*Crisis_acc),Capital 
Structure*Crisis_mkt(CapitalStructure*Crisis_acc),Lnemployee*Crisis_mkt (Lnemployee*Crisis_acc), 
Investment*Crisis_mkt(Investment*Crisis_acc),Advertising*Crisis_mkt(Advertising*Crisis_acc),Research*Crisis
_mkt(Research*Crisis_acc), Firm age*Crisis_mkt (Firm age*Crisis_acc) and Return volatility*Crisis_mkt (Return 
volatility*Crisis_acc) are interactions between Crisis_mkt (Crisis_acc) and Size, Capital Structure, Ln employee, 
Investment, Advertising, Research, Firm age and Return volatility respectively. The sample comprises 658 firms 
from S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 
index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 
10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively. 
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Table 7 IV two stage OLS estimation of founder firm outperformance in OROA during the crisis 
First stage regression   Second stage regression 
Dependent variable: Founder   Dependent variable: Difference in OROA 
Old firm  -0.141 *** Founder 0.059 * 
(0.024) (0.031)
Difference in Size 0.078 Difference in Size -0.060 ***
(0.064) (0.011)
Difference in Capital structure 0.002 Difference in Capital structure 0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
Difference in Ln employee 0.014 Difference in Ln employee 0.047 ***
(0.073) (0.012)
Difference in Advertising  7.763 ** Difference in Advertising  -0.246
(3.572) (0.553)
Difference in Research -0.329 Difference in Research -0.389 ** 
(1.417) (0.162)
Difference in Return volatility -0.626 Difference in Return volatility -0.128
(0.397) (0.081)
Difference in Investment -1.143 *** Difference in Investment 0.103 * 
(0.342) (0.057)
_cons 0.174 *** _cons -0.011 * 
(0.028) (0.005)
R-squared 0.0019 R-squared 0.1082
N 574     N 574   
This table reports results of IV two stage OLS regression of firm performance before and during the financial crisis 
on founder dummy. Founder is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a founder firm. Founder firms are firms 
where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member,CEO, or a blockholder (has at least 
a 5 percent share holding). Difference in OROA is the difference between average OROA of the period from 2009-
2010 and average OROA of the period from 2006-2008.OROA is the earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 
divided by the book values of the total assets. Old firm is a dummy variable, which is one if the sample firm is 
incorporated before 1960. Difference in Size is the difference between the average size of the period from 2009-
2010 and the average size of the period from 2006-2008.Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of the total 
assets of a firm. Difference in capital structure is the difference between the average capital structure of the period 
from 2009-2010 and the average capital structure of the period from 2006-2008.Capital structure is the book value 
of the total liability (the book value of the total asset – the book value of the equity) divided by the book value of the 
total equity. Difference in Investment is the difference between the average investment of the period from 2009-
2010 and the average investment of the period from 2006-2008. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by the 
PPE of the last fiscal year. Difference in Ln employee is the difference between average Ln employee of the period 
from 2009-2010 and the average Ln employee of the period from 2006-2008. Ln employee is the natural logarithm 
of the number of employees in the firm. Difference in advertising is the difference between the average advertising 
of the period from 2009-2010 and average Advertising of the period from 2006-2008.Advertising is yearly 
advertising expense divided by the sales. Difference in research is the difference between the average research of the 
period from 2009-2010 and the average research of the period from 2006-2008. Research is the yearly research and 
the development expense divided by the sales. Difference in return volatility is the difference between the average 
return volatility of the period from 2009-2010 and the average return volatility of the period from 2006-2008.Return 
volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. 
The sample comprises 658 firms from S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and 
FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively. 
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Table 8 Fixed effect estimation of an alternative measure of market performance (Alpha) 
  Dependent variable: Alpha 
Crisis_mkt 0.060 * 0.060 * 
(0.034) (0.032) 
Family*Crisis_mkt 0.007 
(0.008) 
Founder*Crisis_mkt 0.013 
(0.010) 
Heir*Crisis_mkt 0.008 
(0.011) 
Family_owned*Crisis_mkt -0.001 
(0.009) 
Leader_owner*Crisis_mkt -0.016 
(0.013) 
Size -0.007 -0.008 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Capital structure 0.005 ** 0.006 *** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Ln employee 0.001 0.002 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Investment 0.055 0.071 * 
(0.038) (0.039) 
Advertising  0.400 0.357 
(0.284) (0.287) 
Research -0.077 -0.039 
(0.088) (0.096) 
Firm age -0.004 *** -0.004 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Return volatility 0.188 0.170 
(0.184) (0.178) 
Size*Crisis_mkt -0.005 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Capital structure*Crisis_mkt -0.005 ** -0.006 ** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Ln employee*Crisis_mkt 0.004 0.003 
(0.003) (0.004) 
Investment*Crisis_mkt -0.048 -0.063 
(0.039) (0.040) 
Advertising*Crisis_mkt -0.002 0.036 
(0.125) (0.129) 
Research*Crisis_mkt 0.042 0.003 
(0.085) (0.088) 
Firm age*Crisis_mkt 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Return volatility*Crisis_mkt -0.075 -0.058 
(0.180) (0.174) 
_cons 0.242 *** 0.239 *** 
(0.066) (0.065) 
Within R-sq 0.057 0.059 
N 1296     1296   
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This table reports results of firm fixed effect model regressions of risk-adjusted 
return of stock before and during the financial crisis from 2006 to 2010. 
Family*Crisis_mkt, Founder*Crisis_mkt, Heir*Crisis_mkt, 
Family_owned*Crisis_mkt and Leader_owner*Crisis_mkt are interactions 
between dummy variable: Family, Founder, Heir, Family_owned, or 
Leader_owner and dummy variable Crisis_mkt. Crisis_mkt is a dummy which is 
one if fiscal year is 2008, 2009 or 2010. This variable indicates the years when the 
financial crisis significantly strikes the financial market. Family is a dummy 
variable, which is one if the sample firm is a family firm.Founder firms are firms 
where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board 
member,CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). Heir firms 
are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of 
the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, CEO, or a blockholder 
(has at least a 5 percent share holding). Family-owned firms are firms where one 
individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 
percent of the outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another 
family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. 
Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously 
a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. 
Alpha is annualized average monthly risk-adjusted return of stock. Monthly risk-
adjusted return is the difference between monthly before-expense return and risk 
premium, defined as the vector of betas times the vector of Fama and French three 
factors (1993) realized in month t. I estimate the betas by a rolling regression 
following Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009). Size is the natural logarithm of the 
book value of the total assets of a firm. Capital structure is the book value of the 
total liability (the book value of the total asset – the book value of the equity) 
divided by the book value of the total equity. Investment is the capital expenditure 
divided by the PPE of the last fiscal year. Ln employee is natural logarithm of the 
number of employees of the firm. Advertising is yearly advertising expense 
divided by sales. Research is yearly research and development expense divided by 
sales. Firm age is the difference between the incorporation year and a fiscal year. 
Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of 
stock returns for the previous 36 months. Size*Crisis_mkt, Capital 
Structure*Crisis_mkt, Ln employee*Crisis_mkt, Investment*Crisis_mkt, 
Advertising*Crisis_mkt, Research*Crisis_mkt, Firm age*Crisis_mkt and Return 
volatility*Crisis_mkt are interactions between Crisis_mkt and Size, Capital 
Structure, Ln employee, Investment, Advertising, Research, Firm age and Return 
volatility respectively. The sample comprises 456 firms from S&P 500 (US) in the 
2011 index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 
percent level (***) respectively. 
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Table 9 Monthly average return volatility of the sample firms 
Notes: This table shows the average monthly return volatility of the sample. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic 
risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. Source: Datastream. 
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Table 10 Finance and investment strategy of founder firms during the crisis 
  Dependent Variable
  Investment Capital structure 
Crisis_acc -0.048 ** 4.551 *** 
(0.024) (1.678)
Founder*Crisis_acc -0.022 ** 0.878 * 
(0.010) (0.464)
Heir*Crisis_acc -0.004 -0.325 
(0.008) (0.413)
Family_owned*Crisis_acc 0.012 * -0.041 
(0.007) (0.219)
Leader_owner*Crisis_acc -0.012 -0.527 
(0.009) (0.396)
Size 0.001 0.888 * 
(0.008) (0.472)
Tobin's Q 0.018 *** 0.010 
(0.004) (0.172)
Firm age -0.003
(0.002)
Ln cash 0.000
(0.003)
Profitability -2.276 
(1.952)
Tangibility 2.413 
(1.454)
Dividend payout 5.106 
(6.847)
Non-debt tax shield 16.769 
(10.533)
Return volatility 0.057 
(5.380)
Size*Crisis_acc 0.002 -0.411 *** 
(0.003) (0.135)
Tobin's Q*Crisis_acc 0.004 -0.379 ** 
(0.003) (0.169)
Firm age*Crisis_acc 0.000
(0.000)
Ln cash*Crisis_acc 0.000
(0.002)
Profitability*Crisis_acc 1.162 
(1.933)
Tangibility*Crisis_acc -0.282 
(0.489)
Dividend payout*Crisis_acc 7.557 
(4.646)
Non-debt tax shield*Crisis_acc 6.017 
(6.451)
Return volatility*Crisis_acc -7.391 
(5.515)
_cons 0.202 ** -7.632 
(0.087) (5.518)
Within R-sq 0.220 0.038 
N 2504 2432   
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This table reports results of firm fixed effect model regressions of firm accounting 
performance before and during the financial crisis from 2006 to 2010. 
Founder*Crisis_acc, Heir*Crisis_acc, Family_owned*Crisis_acc and 
Leader_owner*Crisis_acc are interactions between dummy variable: Founder, Heir, 
Family_owned, or Leader_owner and dummy variable: Crisis_acc. Crisis_acc is a dummy 
which is one if the fiscal year is 2009 and 2010. This variable indicates the years when 
the financial crisis significantly strikes real economy. Founder is a dummy which equals 
one if a firm is a founder firm. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the 
firm holds/hold a position as a board member,CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 
percent share holding). Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) 
of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, CEO, 
or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). Family-owned firms are firms 
where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 
10 percent of the outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family 
firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader/owner firms are 
firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with 
an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. Investment is the capital expenditure 
divided by the PPE of the last fiscal year. Capital structure is the book value of the total 
liability (the book value of the total asset – the book value of the equity) divided by the 
book value of the total equity. Ln cash is the natural logarithm of cash. Size is the natural 
logarithm of the book value of the total assets of a firm. Tobin’s Q is the market value of 
equity plus the book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of 
equity) divided by the book value of the total assets. Firm age is the difference between 
the incorporation year and a fiscal year. Profitability is Operating Return on Assets of last 
fiscal year. Tangibility is tangible assets divided by the book values of the total assets. 
Dividend payout is the dividend divided by the sales. Non-debt tax shield is the 
depreciation and amortization divided by the book value of the total assets. Return 
volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for 
the previous 36 months. Size*Crisis_acc, Capital Structure*Crisis_acc, Ln 
employee*Crisis_acc, Investment*Crisis_acc,Ln cash*Crisis_acc, Advertising*Crisis_acc,  
Research*Crisis_acc, Firm age*Crisis_acc and Return volatility*Crisis_acc, 
Profitability*Crisis_acc, Tangibility*Crisis_acc,  Dividend payout*Crisis_acc, Non-debt 
tax shield*Crisis_acc and Tobin’s Q*Crisis_acc are interactions between Crisis_acc and 
Size, Capital Structure, Ln employee, Investment, Ln cash, Advertising, Research, Firm 
age, Return volatility, Profitability, Tangibility, Dividend payout, Non-debt tax shield and 
Tobin’s Q respectively. The sample comprises 658 firms from S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 
(UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index 
company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) 
respectively.
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Appendix 1 S&P index slumps in September 2008 
Source: Yahoo finance (finance.yahoo.com) 
Appendix 2 GDP annual growth rate for the US, the UK, Germany, France, and Italy 
Source: world Bank 
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Appendix 4 Fixed effect estimation of founder firm outperformance in OROA during the crisis 
(non-financial firms, US firms, and US-non-financial firms) 
  Dependent Variable: OROA 
  Non-financial firms US firms   US non-financial firms 
Crisis_acc 0.009 -0.008 0.011 
(0.022) (0.025) (0.033) 
Founder*Crisis_acc 0.017 * 0.025 ** 0.031 ** 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
Heir*Crisis_acc 0.003 0.004 0.005 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Family_owned*Crisis_acc -0.001 0.003 0.001 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Leader_owner*Crisis_acc -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Size -0.028 *** -0.036 *** -0.049 ** 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.019) 
Capital structure 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln employee 0.019 * 0.036 ** 0.042 ** 
(0.010) (0.016) (0.018) 
Investment -0.047 -0.113 *** -0.097 ** 
(0.034) (0.042) (0.047) 
Advertising  -0.668 ** -0.529 -0.703 ** 
(0.323) (0.356) (0.350) 
Research 0.122 0.091 0.098 
(0.082) (0.093) (0.097) 
Firm age 0.004 *** 0.008 *** 0.010 *** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Return volatility 0.186 ** 0.493 *** 0.629 *** 
(0.077) (0.143) (0.171) 
Size*Crisis_acc -0.003 0.000 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Capital structure*Crisis_acc 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.002 * 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln employee*Crisis_acc 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Investment*Crisis_acc -0.080 *** -0.039 -0.034 
(0.030) (0.035) (0.038) 
Advertising*Crisis_acc 0.255 *** 0.248 *** 0.260 *** 
(0.064) (0.072) (0.076) 
Research*Crisis_acc 0.098 *** 0.092 ** 0.110 ** 
(0.037) (0.043) (0.046) 
Firm age*Crisis_acc 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return volatility*Crisis_acc -0.114 ** -0.380 *** -0.484 *** 
(0.048) (0.134) (0.142) 
_cons 0.112 -0.059 -0.036 
(0.088) (0.134) (0.156) 
Within R-sq 0.163 0.182 0.206 
N 1855     1335     1207   
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This table reports results of robustness tests of firm fixed effect model regressions of firm performance before and 
during the financial crisis from 2006 to 2010. The first column represents the results of non-financial firms. The 
second column represents the results of US firms. The third column represents the results of US non-financial firms. 
Founder*Crisis_acc, Heir*Crisis_acc, Family_owned*Crisis_acc, and Leader_owner*Crisis_acc are interactions 
between dummy variable: Founder, Heir, Family_owned, or Leader_owner and dummy variable: Crisis_acc. 
Crisis_acc is a dummy which is one if the fiscal year is 2009 and 2010. This variable indicates the years when the 
financial crisis significantly strikes real economy. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm 
holds/hold a position as a board member,CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). Heir firms 
are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position 
either as a board member, CEO, or a blockholder (has at least a 5 percent share holding). Family-owned firms are 
firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of the 
outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the 
family controls or owns. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a 
significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. OROA is earnings before interests 
and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book values of the total assets. Capital structure is the book value of the total 
liability (the book value of the total asset – the book value of the equity) divided by the book value of the total 
equity. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by the PPE of the last fiscal year. Ln employee is natural 
logarithm of the number of employees of the firm. Advertising is yearly advertising expense divided by sales. 
Research is yearly research and development expense divided by sales. Firm age is the difference between the 
incorporation year and a fiscal year. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of 
stock returns for the previous 36 months. Size*Crisis_acc, Capital Structure*Crisis_acc, Ln employee*Crisis_acc, 
Investment*Crisis_acc, Advertising*Crisis_acc, Research*Crisis_acc, Firm age*Crisis_acc and Return 
volatility*Crisis_acc are interactions between Crisis_acc and Size, Capital Structure, Ln employee, Investment, 
Advertising, Research, Firm age and Return volatility respectively. The sample comprises 542 non-financial firms 
from S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 
index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 
10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively. 
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CEO Divorce and Firm Performance 

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Abstract
      This paper provides the first empirical evidence showing that divorce has a significant effect 
on the economic outcome of an organization, in addition to its widely-documented impact on 
individuals. Using an informative dataset which covers almost all Danish private firms and CEO 
personal and family information (like CEO’s marriage history), I evaluate the economic 
consequence of CEO divorce on the firm he helms. The results show that firms subsequently 
underperform after CEO divorces, both relative to previous performance and relative to non-
divorce firms. The negative effect of divorce is consistent whether I adopt all non-divorce firms 
or matched non-divorce firms as control. My empirical results further suggest that marital 
conflict between the divorcing couple serves as one channel through which divorce strikes firm 
performance.  
      JEL classifications: G30; G34; G38; K22 
Key words: CEO, divorce, family firms, firm performance 
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1 Introduction 
Does CEO divorce affect firm performance? If so, why is that? Through which channel(s) does 
CEO divorce affect corporate performance? While numerous papers (for instance, Peterson, 
1996; Gupta et al., 1999; Piketty, 2003) focus on the impact of divorce on individual economic 
status and well-being (men, women and children),congesting economic and sociological 
literature,  scant research touches upon the economic consequence of divorce at a broader 
organizational level. This paper aims to fill the gap by investigating economic influence of CEO 
divorce on firm performance. Analysis of CEO divorce is particularly interesting as CEOs are 
often the most powerful and visible individuals, who most likely affect firm performance. 
      Over the last several decades, industrial countries have experienced an increase in divorce 
rates. The OECD (2010) reports that during the period from 1970 to 2007, divorce rates rose in 
almost all OECD countries, except for Estonia and Latvia where initial divorce rates were high in 
1970. In Europe, for instance, divorce rates of all countries were less than 2.5 divorces per 1,000 
married people in 1960, with many countries experiencing a ratio below 1. The divorce rates of 
most countries, however, climb to some 5 per 1,000 married people by 2002 (Gonzalez and 
Vittanen, 2006).  
[Insert Figure 1] 
      The rise in divorce rates has drawn increasing attentions from both researchers and policy 
makers. Extant literature, however, only concentrates on the consequences of divorce at an 
individual level. Yet the investigation of divorce impact is scant at the organizational level. Little 
access to private data like divorce records of top business leaders might be the reason for 
shortage of this type of research. Nevertheless, using a rare dataset covering almost all Danish 
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private firms and CEO personal and family information (like CEO marriage history), this paper 
contributes to existing literature by analyzing economic consequence of CEO divorce.
      In this article, I pose two research questions. The primary concern is to explore whether CEO 
divorce has a significant effect on ex-post firm performance.  
      Divorce comprises a dramatic transformation from an intimate, usually harmonious 
relationship into an antagonistic, often painful one (Hopper, 2001). Therefore, divorce may 
inflict costs on firms through the following channels: first, marital status shift varies CEO’s time 
allocation (for example, children-rearing takes more personal time than in marriage) between 
household and productive activities (Becker, 1965), which is likely to hurt firm performance. 
Second, spousal goodwill is lost after divorce (e.g. Poza and Messer, 2001). Mental stress 
increases, leading to work inefficiency and errors. Third, in the context of family firms, costs arise 
in extra ways: (1) Partnership synergies disappear when the couple breaks up and the two 
families behind the marriage cut off the business relationship; (2) Personal economic status drop 
may result in firm credit constraint and further underinvestment, given limited finance 
instruments for small family firms and ambiguous division of personal wealth and firm fund; and 
(3) Divorce entails marital conflict, which I interpret as difference in interests due to divergent 
commitments to the same firm given one party will soon leave the business, and related non-
cooperation or antagonism between divorcing couple in terms of firm operation. Marital conflict 
may bring about high cost when both husband and wife are simultaneously top managers or 
board members.  
      However, the cost of CEO divorce imposed on a firm is less definitive. “Divorce is a leap in 
the dark.” 1  Proxying for psychological well-being with General Health Quality and life 
satisfactory scores, Gardner and Osward (2005) show that couples become happier when their 

1  Refer to the abstract of “Do divorcing couples become happier by breaking up?” Gardner and Osward ,2005.  
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marriages come to an end. Men and women reap happiness from divorce equally. It is reasonable 
to assume that mental happiness can enhance working efficiency and spur inspirations. In this 
sense, divorces may rescue CEOs from a bitter marriage, benefiting ex-post firm performance. 
Thus, the influence of CEO divorce on performance of the firm he leads remains an empirical 
question.
      A leading challenge of treatment (divorce in the context) analysis is to find a credible 
counterfactual, given the endogeneity of divorce. CEO divorces are not randomly assigned to the 
sample firms. Divorce CEOs and firms might be unobservably different from non-divorce ones. 
If I compare performance change before and after the divorce years of divorce firms with that of 
all non-divorce firms, the estimation will suffer from selection bias. I adopt several empirical 
methods to tackle this issue. The main identification strategy is to construct a reliable 
counterfactual using nearest neighbor Propensity Score (PS) matching estimator similar to the 
approach by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Abadie and Imbens (2007) and Malmendier and Tate 
(2009). The big sample size and substantial overlap across divorce and non-divorce firms fulfill 
the preconditions (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002) of the PS matching estimator. I first run 
a probit regression to predict divorce based on a bunch of matching variables measuring CEO, 
CEO family and firm characteristics at the time of pre-treatment year (one year prior to the 
divorce calendar year). Next, I obtain a sample of matched non-divorce firms by matching each 
divorce firm to a non-divorce firm, which has the closest predicted likelihood of divorce 
(propensity score) to the actual divorce firm. A concern arises regarding heterogeneity not fully 
captured by observable covariates. The remaining heterogeneity across divorce firms and 
matched non-divorce firms will bias our estimation if it is orthogonal to observable covariates. 
Following Malmendier and Tate (2009), I minimize this bias by verifying that the matched 
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sample and the divorce sample are undifferentiated with respect to almost all observable 
covariates, including all the covariates which are not the matching variables and the interactions 
of major matching variables.  
      I find that firms subsequently underperform after the CEO divorces, both relative to previous 
performances and relative to non-divorce firms. The findings are consistent whether I adopt all 
non-divorce firms or matched non-divorce firms as control. CEO divorce firms underperform no-
event-counterparts during the same period by 3.4 percent of industry-adjusted Operating Return 
on Assets (OROA).  Thus, CEO divorce has a negative effect on firm performance.  
      Next, I try to explore the mechanism through which CEO divorce hits firm performance. I 
assume that marital conflict prevails in each divorcing couple around the divorce year and 
investigate whether marital conflict diminishes firm performance. I approach the task by 
examining the impact of joint-management (both of the divorcing couple are top managers/board 
members) on OROA during the divorce period (5 consecutive year window centered by the 
divorce year). The results of fixed effect model provide evidence of the cost of marital conflict. 
An alternative interpretation of this finding is asset expropriation or rent seeking from a self-
interested spouse board member in a shortly-cracked partnership.
      Credit constraint may also serve as a second channel through which divorce strikes corporate 
performance given the ambiguousness of personal fund and firm fund in family firms. However, 
difference in difference test around the divorce year fails to find significant difference in short 
term debt and capital structure variation between divorce firms and matched non-divorce firms.  
      The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: first, in Section 2, I present a review of 
related literature. Second, I describe the dataset in Section 3. Third, in Section 4, I discuss about 
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our empirical strategy. Fourth, I show our empirical findings in Sections 5. A discussion of 
policy implication of the findings concerning unilateral divorce laws and Corporate Governance 
codes is given in Section 6. Finally I conclude.
2 Divorce consequence, CEO value and family events and firm performance 

It is the rise in divorce rates around the world that receives more attentions from academics in 
various fields. Some inquire into the reasons of rise of divorce rates and ascribe it to the 
liberalization of divorce laws, that is, no-fault unilateral divorce. They argue that introduction of 
unilateral divorce reduces costs of divorce because mutual consent is no longer compulsory (c.f. 
Fredberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006, Gonzalez and Vittanen, 2006). 
      More attempts, however, are to scrutinize consequences of divorce per se and softening of 
divorce law. On one hand, for example, Peterson (2002) uses 1977-1978 Los Angeles sample 
and documents that divorced women’s economic status drops by 27 percent, while men’s by 10 
percent. Using mother-child data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Jo 
Cioro et al. (1999) evidence that divorce and separation are related to increases in children’s 
behavioral problems, without regard to the level of conflict between parents.
      On the other hand, Stevensen and Wolfers (2006) show that introduction of unilateral divorce 
engenders a 8–16 percent decline in female suicide, roughly a 30 percent decline in domestic 
violence for both men and women, and a 10 percent decline in female homicides by her partners.  
Stevensen (2007) finds that adoption of unilateral divorce, despite the prevalent division of 
property law, induces underinvestment in almost all types of marriage-specific capital considered 
except ownership of house. 
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      Both economists and sociologists, however, channel all their researches into impact of 
divorce on individual (men, women and children) economic status or well-being. Studies into the 
consequence of divorce in a broader range like an organization are still missing. The main 
contribution of the paper is to supply this knowledge lack by focusing on a special group of 
people, CEOs of firms, the pivotal leaders of business. Using an informative Danish closely-held 
private firm dataset with CEO personal and family tree data, I aim to evidence the relationship 
between CEO divorce and performance of the firm the CEO helms.  
      CEOs matter to firm operation and decision-making. Performing an event study, Weisbach 
(1988) and Bonnier and Bruner (1989) document significantly positive stock price reaction to 
CEO turnover decision. Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González and Wolfenzon (2008) show that 
CEOs’ own death and bereavement are strongly correlated to declines in firm profitability. More 
recently, Malmendier and Tate (2009) report that after CEOs win major awards, the firms’ 
market and accounting performance decrease, especially for those firms with weak Corporate 
Governance. I supplement this strand of research from a novel perspective, consequence of 
CEO’s marital status shift on firm performance, testifying CEO value to firms.  
      The value of CEOs is more significant in family firms, where family and business are 
intertwined (Lansberg, 1988; Shama, 2004) and family business heavily relies on top leaders like 
CEOs. It is the characteristics, events and interactions of multi-stakeholders of controlling family 
behind the family firm that have a profound influence on decision-making and other outcome of 
family firms by means of ownership structure, management and governance (Astrachan, Klien, 
and Smyrnios, 2002). Pérez-González (2006) and Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González and 
Wolfenzon (2007) identify a causal effect of family succession on deterioration of firm 
performance, criticizing nepotism in family firms. By contrast, Mehrotra, Morck, Shim and 
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Wiwattanakantang (2010) show that Japanese inherited family firms outperform non-family 
firms and adopted heir’s firms perform best. Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that family 
ownership adds value only when the founder serves as CEO or as Chairman of board. 
Disproportionate voting right reduces the founder’s premium. Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, 
and Schoar (2008) document that in Thailand greater family involvement in ownership and board 
membership by founders’ sons is negatively associated with firm performance. Again in 
Thailand, financial market reacts positively to the marriage of a family member from a family 
firm if the partner comes from another family with political or business influence 
(Bunkanwanicha, Fan and Wiwattanakantang, 2010). Because domination of family firms 
features as one of the characteristics of Danish economy 2  (Bennedsen and Neilsen, 2010), 
Denmark provides an ideal research environment, given its high divorce rate, of examining the 
effect of CEO divorce on family firm performance. Employing a rich dataset covering almost all 
Danish private firms, I provide new evidence to the significant relationship between incidents of 
controlling family (like a family member’s divorce) and outcomes of family firms.  
      Finally, this paper contributes to literature of Corporate Governance with regard to board 
study. Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that female board members mitigate the attendance 
problem of male board members. Gender diversity, however, has a negative effect on firm 
performance on average. They suggest that adoption of gender quotas for directors can diminish 
firm value with good governance. The results of this paper are consistent with their argument of 
board gender diversity to some extent. I suggest that couple presence at the corporate board have 

2 In our setting, we follow Ampenberger, Bennedsen and Zhou (2011), defining family firms as firms with one or several 
members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares, or firms in which the CEO is 
simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. We find that family firms 
account for 92.33 percent of the sample. 
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the chance of imposing potential costs on firm performance and it may not be the optimal 
arrangement.  
3 Data source and sampling criteria 

This research employs a rare and informative Danish dataset, which covers almost all the active 
private and public firms in Denmark, reporting various accounting information of these firms 
along with details of controlling family and family members who are in top managers, board 
members and owners of the firms from 1994 to 2006. The main body of the dataset consists of 
three data sources: 
a. Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB): This dataset covers accounting and ownership 
information of all registered limited liability firms in Denmark. The dataset is based on annual 
reports which all Danish companies with limited liability are required to file with the Ministry of 
Economics and Business Affairs. The data includes accounting data, information on the 
composition of the management board and basic ownership structures. Despite the nature of 
being privately held, the accounting statistics in KOB are reliable in that they originate from 
annual reports, which should be, regulated in Danish company law, audited and approved by 
external accountants. 
b. Erhvervs-og Selskab-sstyrelsen (E&S): Another significant source of information tapping the 
top managerial echelon of firms derives from the dataset administrated by agency Erhvervs-og 
Selskab-sstyrelsen (The Danish Commerce and Companies Agency), at the Ministry of 
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Economics and Business Affairs. This strand of information includes all the names of historical 
top managers (CEOs), members of directorates (both managerial and supervisory boards). As is 
stipulated in Danish Company Law, firms are required to file any variations concerning CEOs 
and board members within two weeks with the Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs, 
which ensure us to clarify all the managerial transitions together with verified tenures. What 
needs to be emphasized is that the dataset contains the CPR number, similar to the Social 
Security Number in the United States of America, a unique citizen identity number, carrying 
information of personal birthday and gender, which poses a pivotal role in identifying the 
relationships of CEOs and the other board members, and merging datasets. 
c. The official Danish Civil Registration System: The third database, administrated by the 
Ministry of Interior, supplies us with detailed information about kinship and family ties within 
the Danish population. Using unique CPR numbers I am able to identify the CEOs’ marriage and 
divorce history, including event time and duration, and the other family characteristics 
information I need in our empirical studies. For instance, I can identify whether a CEO and 
his/her divorced spouse are simultaneously present in the board.
      By unambiguous CPR numbers, I merge E&S dataset with Danish Civil Registration dataset 
and get CEOs’ personal and family information. Next I link the firm with CEO information to its 
accounting data in KOB dataset through firm identity numbers, which coexist in both datasets. 
Taking into account plausible different impact of CEO’s 1st divorce and subsequent divorce(s), I 
only focus on the 1st time divorce. Firms experiencing CEO transitions are excluded. Finally, I 
end up with 244 CEO divorce firms with full information for a 5 consecutive year window 
centered by the divorce year. Firms with CEO turnovers and other family events (like 
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bereavements) are excluded. Appendix 1 gives us a picture of sample size distribution of divorce 
and all non-divorce firms. 

4 Identification strategy 

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the economic effect of CEO divorce on the 
firm’s ex-post performance after the divorce year. An ideal experimental framework would be to 
compare the actual performance change of CEO divorce firms with performance change of the 
same firms had the divorce not happened. The counterfactual, nevertheless, cannot be observed. I 
therefore need to find a proxy for hypothetical firm performance without divorce. A simple 
departure point is a difference in difference (DID) analysis, comparing ex-post performance of 
divorce firms with that of non-divorce firms in the same calendar year. The fundamental model 
is as follows: 
'
1 1 1 1i i iy a X b c divorce                                          (1)
Where:  iy    is difference in industry-adjusted Operating Return on Assets (OROA), which is 
two-year mean after divorce year minus two-year mean before divorce year;  idivorce is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the CEO of a firm gets divorced and zero otherwise and 1c  is the 
coefficient of interest;  iX are a k*1 vector of control variables. 
      Operating Return on Assets is regarded as a natural measure of firm performance because it 
acts as a comprehensive proxy for a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) relative to 
its book asset, the earning generator (Bennedsen et al., 2007). Unlike net income-based measure 
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like Return on Assets (ROA), it is unaffected by the variation of capital structure, which 
determines corporate tax base. Unlike return on equity (ROE), it captures total assets rather than 
part of it. I use industry-adjusted OROA as our primary measure of performance, while other 
measures like industry-adjusted ROA are also employed for robustness test.
      DID approach will reach a valid estimator if the treatment (divorce here) is randomly 
assigned to the sample firms.  In other words, treatment should be exogenous. This assumption, 
however, is highly challenging. Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that CEO divorce firms 
differ dramatically from non-divorce firms in almost all the CEO personal and family 
characteristics.  Except CEO gender, all the other variables are significantly different between 
CEO divorce firms and non-divorce firms at 1 percent level, and first marriage age is 
significantly different at 5 percent level.  Divorced CEOs are characterized by late marriages, 
longer working years, lower divorce ages, bigger age difference of the couples, and higher 
probabilities of parental divorces and joint-management with their spouse in the boards.  In 
addition, divorce firms are significantly different from non-divorce firms in short term debt and 
fixed asset at 10 percent level. In regard to region and industry distributions, divorce firms are 
overrepresented in capital region of Denmark and in the industry of wholesale, retail, hotels and 
restaurants3. Economically, these differences imply that divorce firms are selected. Therefore, if I 
employ all the non-divorce firms as control group, I am unable to indentify an unbiased and 
consistent estimator, given underlying determinants of selection are correlated to outcome 
performances. Because most of our sample firms are family firms, intertwinement of family and 
business indicates that some unobservable family level characteristics are most likely to sway 
family firm performance. Those characteristics, at the same time, might determine CEO divorce.  

3 Here we use 2-digit Danish Industrial Classification to identify 8 industries.  
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      Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Abadie and Imbens (2007) and Malmendier and 
Tate (2009), I use a nearest-neighbor propensity score (PS) matching estimator to construct a 
matched control group to tackle the selection bias. PS matching estimator pairs treatment and 
control units that are similar in terms of pre-treatment observable covariates. If all the relevant 
heterogeneity across treatment and matched groups are captured by these observable covariates, 
which implies outcomes are viewed as independent of assignment of treatment conditional on 
pre-treatment covariates, PS matching will provide a valid estimator (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).  
      Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) argue that a good PS matching estimator should have 
several preconditions. Firstly, a large sample is required for locating similar pairs. Secondly, 
there must be a substantial overlap between treatment and control. These preconditions hold in 
our setting. On one hand, I have around 11,000 control firms from which only 244 treatment 
firms need to be matched. On the other hand, similarities in many firm level characteristics 
between divorce and non-divorce firms in Table 1 make substantial overlap possible. The result 
of matched sample characteristics again proves this point. In short, the rich dataset legitimates 
the use of PS matching estimator.  
      One concern arises regarding heterogeneity not fully captured by observable covariates. The 
remaining heterogeneity will bias the estimator if it is orthogonal to observable covariates. 
Following Malmendier and Tate (2009), I minimize this bias by ensuring that there are no 
differences of observable covariates, including all the covariates which are not matching 
variables and interactions of major matching variables. I will elaborate on this point below in 
descriptive statistics interpretation. 
[Insert Table 1] 
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      I set up a matched control group as follows: first, for each divorce calendar year, I run a 
probit regression to predict divorce firms based on matching variables of pre-divorce year (one 
year prior to the divorce calendar year). Specifically, in 2000, for instance, the sample consists of 
all the firms, both divorce and non-divorce firms. I assign one to a firm which experiences a 
CEO divorce in 2000 and zero to those which do not. I further regress divorce dummy on the 
matching variables in 1999 (one year prior to the divorce calendar year).  The matching variables 
I select are: CEO first marriage age, CEO gender, CEO age, firm size (natural logarithm of total 
assets), debt ratio (the ratio of book debt to total asset), profitability (industry-adjusted OROA 
last year), industry dummy and region dummy. Psychological and sociological literature 
documents the correlation between early marriage age and divorce risk over the years4 (e.g. 
Kiernan and Mueller, 1998; Larsen and Tilson, 2000). Wilson (2008) reports that professional 
women outnumber men in failing personal relationships. Age is widely used by literature as a 
predictor of divorce and CEO age is significantly different between divorce and non-divorce 
firms in the sample. I, therefore, use first marriage age of CEO, CEO gender and age as the main 
predictors of CEO divorce. Additionally, I involve firm size, debt ratio, industry dummy and 
region dummy in the matching variable list to ensure that divorce firms and matched non-divorce 
firms are indistinguishable before CEO divorce. To control for ex-ante difference, I also include 
profitability, the lagged industry-adjusted OROA as a matching variable. In brief, by combining 
two groups of matching variables, I aim to minimize heterogeneity across divorce firms and non-
divorce firms in terms of CEO personal and family characteristics and firm characteristics. 
[Insert Table 2] 

4 Their findings differ from our observations in Table 1. However, we still include this variable as a predictor of divorce.  
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      Table 2 presents the results of this probit regression for year 20035. The coefficient estimates 
confirm the predictive power of CEO age. Younger CEOs are significantly more likely to get 
divorced, even controlling for firm characteristics. The other CEO characteristics (gender and 
first marriage age) and firm characteristics, however, do not have significant predictive power.
      Second, I use the predicted values of probit regression, that is, propensity scores, to construct 
a matched non-divorce control sample for the divorce firms. For each divorce firm, without 
replacement6, I select one non-divorce firm with the propensity score closest (nearest neighbor) 
to the divorce firm. Using propensity scores rather than direct matching variables enables us to 
mitigate the problem of dimensionality of matching (Malmendier and Tate, 2009) and obtain a 
matched control group with the highest ex-ante similarity to divorce firms in firm and CEO 
characteristics.
      Last, I combine the matched firms of each year into a group of all matched non-divorce firms 
across all the divorce calendar years. In doing so, I end up with a sample consisting of 244 
divorce firms and their 244 most similar non-divorce counterparts. 
      Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of three groups: all non-divorce firms, matched non-
divorce firms, and divorce firms in all divorce years. Besides average values, I include medians 
and standard deviations for each variable in the 2nd and 3rd column of each category in Panel A. I 
also test the statistical differences in the last two columns of the table. In contrast to all non-
divorce firms, which are significantly different from divorce firms in multi-dimensions, matched 
sample is highly similar to divorce firms. Among all the major matching variables, none of them 

5 Since I perform the PS matching year by year, I only present the results for year 2003, when I have the biggest number of 
observations.
6 There is a tradeoff between quality and precision when we choose with replacement or without replacement. If we apply with 
replacement, the average matching quality will increase. But simultaneously fewer control firms are used, reducing the precision. 
I apply without replacement here because the treatment sample is small and the control sample is big enough to enable me to get
good matching quality without replacing the used control firms. In the section of Robustness tests, I apply with replacement using
the same matching variables. The results are consistent with those in the case of without replacement.  
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is significantly different between divorce firms and matched non-divorce firms. Furthermore, 
there are also no significant differences in industry and region distributions after matching 
(please refer to Panel B).  
      I rely on additional tests to examine the quality of matching and minimize remaining 
heterogeneity. First, I test the differences of all the other observable covariates, which are not 
matching variables, between matched non-divorce firms and divorce firms. None but joint-
management is significantly different at 1 percent level. In the case of joint-management, 
however, medians are the same in both divorce firms and matched non-divorce firms. Second, 
following Malmendier and Tate (2009), I perform a t-test of pair interactions across matched 
non-divorce firms and divorce firms. If interactions of two major matching variables can predict 
divorce and performance, excluding them from matching strategy will lead to bias. Appendix 2 
reveals all 15 interactions difference test. No one is significantly different at 10 percent level.
      In summary, applying all non-divorce firms as control engenders selective bias when 
investigating the ex-post effect of CEO divorce on firm performance. To cope with this problem, 
I utilize a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimator and construct a matched non-
divorce control sample. After matching, almost all the observable dimensions are similar across 
divorce firms and matched non-divorce firms, by contrast to the case of all non-divorce firms. 
Extra tests are applied to the minimization of remaining heterogeneity.   
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5 Empirical results 

The principal objective of this paper is to examine the ex-post impact of CEO divorce on firm 
performance and investigate the channel of this impact. I have elaborated on the main 
econometric strategy, that is, nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimator, and further 
check matching quality. In the following section, I will show the empirical results.
5.1 The negative effect of CEO divorce on firm performance 
I begin with a univariate difference in difference analysis of OROA, ROA, industry-adjusted 
OROA and industry-adjusted ROA. Again, I list the 4 performance indicators of all non-divorce 
firms, matched non-divorce firms and divorce firms side by side around divorce calendar year in 
Table 3.
[Insert Table 3] 
      My first step focuses on comparison between all non-divorce firms and divorce firms. Three 
points need to be emphasized. First of all, I notice that before divorce calendar year, ROA and 
OROA of divorce firms are similar to those of non-divorce firms without significant differences 
at 10 percent level. After divorce calendar year, however, ROA and OROA of non-divorce firms 
are significantly higher than divorce firms by 1.7 and 1.8 percent respectively. Secondly, OROA 
and ROA of divorce firms drop while those of all non-divorce firms increase after the same 
divorce calendar years. The performance differences around divorce calendar year of ROA and 
OROA are significantly different between divorce and non-divorce at 5 percent level.  Thirdly, 
industry-adjusted performance variations across the same divorce calendar year for the two 
groups differ significantly. Divorce firms decrease much more dramatically than non-divorce 
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firms (for example, difference in industry-adjusted OROA of divorce firms is   -.0031 versus -
0.01 of non-divorce firms, which means that divorce firms experience a performance drop 3.1 
times as high as non-divorce firms).  
      Next, I center on the comparison between matched non-divorce firms and divorce firms, 
which is free from selection bias. What strikes us is that none of the 4 measures of performance 
(ROA, OROA industry-adjusted ROA and industry-adjusted OROA) drops for matched non-
divorce firms. All the performance measures before and after divorce year are not significantly 
different at 10 percent level. This means that matched non-divorce firms, during the same 5 year 
period as divorce firms, maintain a stable and consistent profitability. By contrast, divorce firms’ 
performance slides sharply, although before divorce years, they are the most similar counterparts 
to matched sample. Differences in performance increments across divorce year between divorce 
firms and matched non-divorce firms are highly significant with at least 5 percent level. More 
importantly, all difference magnitudes increase relative to the case of comparing divorce firms 
with all non-divorce firms. Difference in difference in industry-adjusted OROA before and after 
divorce year, for example, grows from 2.1 percent to 3.7 percent. The growth rate is 76 percent. 
Besides, after divorce industry-adjusted performance measures (industry-adjusted ROA and 
industry-adjusted OROA) are now significantly different at 10 percent level between divorce 
firms and matched non-divorce firms, whereas they are not when I use all non-divorce firms as 
control group. Difference expansion and significance increase imply the selection bias. Using all 
non-divorce firms as control underestimates the negative effect of CEO divorce.
      The deterioration impact of divorce on performance can be consolidated by the pattern in 
Figure 2, where I plot the evolutions of average values of industry-adjusted ROA and industry-
adjusted OROA around divorce years in the case of all non-divorce firms, matched non-divorce 
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firms and divorce firms respectively. Whereas non-divorce firms’ mean performance falls 
slightly and smoothly along divorce window, matched non-divorce firms, despite a small shock 
in divorce year, keep an identical profitability to the level before divorce year. As a whole, non-
divorce firms, either matched sample or all, hold a preserving pattern. Divorce firms, however, 
follow a decidedly disparate trajectory. Industry-adjusted OROA and ROA both slump during 
the 5 year period.
[Insert Figure 2] 
      After univariate and graphical analyses, I turn to fundamental econometric model (1) for 
more precise estimation of the negative effect of CEO divorce. Table 4 reveals Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) results of model (1). Again I classify the results into two categories. One is for the 
case where all non-divorce firms are control sample and the other matched non-divorce firms. In 
the first case, I control for CEO gender, CEO age, CEO couple Joint-management status, firm 
size, capital structure, profitability at the time of divorce. I also include year dummy for 
controlling for macroeconomic factors. As for the second case, I exclude the controls of CEO 
gender and age, which, after matching, have fewer variations.  
       The table shows that regardless of change in control variable and control group, the 
coefficient of dummy divorce is consistently significantly different from zero across all the 
specifications at 5 percent level. The negative value demonstrates that divorce firms do 
underperform non-divorce firms after the CEO suffers from divorce. The results are robust 
whether I choose all non-divorce firms or matched non-divorce firms as control.    
[Insert Table 4] 
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 With respect to the magnitude of coefficients, the results are consistent with the findings in 
preceding univariate analysis. Applying all non-divorce firms as control bears the cost of 
selection bias. Across all the specifications, absolute values of coefficients of dummy divorce are 
much smaller (by about 35 percent) in the case of full sample control than matched sample 
control.  Nearest neighbor propensity score matching estimator provides a reliable estimate cost 
of divorce. Firms after CEO divorce underperform no-event-counterparts during the same period 
by 3 percent of industry-adjusted OROA. 
      I also check the performance aggravation in the interval of 5 year divorce window with fixed 
effect estimation in Table 5. The results illustrate that firm performance after divorce fall 
significantly by about 3 percent of industry-adjusted OROA relative to prior performances. 
Performance drops are consistently significant at 5 percent level across two different control 
samples. Magnitudes of coefficients are bigger in matched sample case, similar to the pattern in 
Table 4, which again implies the existence of selection bias. The results are significant whether I 
control for years.
[Insert Table 5] 
      In a word, I conclude this section by stating that firms subsequently underperform after CEO 
divorces, both relative to previous performances and relative to non-divorce firms.  
5.2 Endogeniety of CEO divorce 

The preceding analysis has already shown that CEO divorce has a negative impact on firm 
performance. However, reverse causality may also exist. Firm performance drop is likely to 
trigger a divorce. An illustrative case is that when a small family firm’s profit falls, the CEO 
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encounters financial distress. The chances are that the distress soon affects his own economic 
status and leads to a breaking-up with his spouse, who cannot accept a frugal life.  
      I tackle the potential reverse causality by comparing pre-divorce performance variations of 
divorce firms with those of matched non-divorce firms and all non-divorce firms. The results in 
Table 6 shows that difference in industry-adjusted OROA between one year before divorce and 
divorce year [-1, 0] of divorce firms is not significantly different from that of matched non-
divorce firms and all non-divorce firms. This means that divorce firms do not underperform non-
divorce firms prior to divorce. The results are consistent whether I check the difference between 
two years before and one year before divorce [-2,-1] or difference between two years before and 
divorce year [-2, 0]. I even examine performance difference between four years before divorce 
and two years before divorce [-4,-2], and three years before and one year before [-3,-1]. Divorce 
firms still do not significantly differ from non-divorce firms. And the findings are robust when I 
replace industry-adjusted OROA with industry-adjusted ROA. 
[Insert Table 6] 
      Because pre-divorce performance of divorce firms is not significantly different from that of 
non-divorce firms, it is hard to say ex-ante performance drop causes CEO divorce. This 
convinces preceding insight into the negative effect of divorce on ex-post firm performance.  
5.3     Robustness tests 
In this section, I conduct several robustness tests. For the first step, I consider whether different 
matching variables will affect my findings. Table 1 shows that joint-management of divorced 
couple is correlated with divorce. I therefore use joint-management and CEO age, the only 
significant predictor of divorce in the probit regression of Table 2, as CEO characteristic 
138 

matching variables and keep all firm level characteristic matching variables (firm size, debt ratio, 
profitability, industry dummy and region dummy) to perform one-to-one nearest neighbor PS 
matching to obtain a new control group. Alternatively, I use fixed asset (Ln fixasset) and short 
term debt (Ln shortdebt) to replace profitability and debt ratio and keep all the other matching 
variables (CEO age, first marriage age, CEO male, firm size, industry dummy and region 
dummy). I use these two variables as new firm level matching variables because they are 
significantly different between divorce firms and non-divorce firms. I the same perform one-to-
one nearest neighbor PS matching to get another control group. Table7 shows the regression 
results of Model (1) using these two new control groups. The signs and magnitudes of dummy 
divorce are highly consistent with those in Table 4.
[Insert Table 7] 
      Next, I check whether the choice of the number of nearest neighbors has an impact on the 
findings. Using the same matching variables as those in my main specification, I obtain 2, 5, and 
10 nearest neighbors respectively. Table 8 shows the regression results of model (1) using 2, 5, 
and 10 nearest neighbors as control group. I find that divorce has a consistent negative effect on 
firm performance across all the specifications in the table.    
[Insert Table 8] 
5.4     Earning management?  
Concerns arise that earning management may drive the underperformance of divorce firms when 
OROA acts as the performance measure. The falling performance after CEO divorce is arguably 
attributable to the CEOs’ incentive for manipulation of earnings. In doing so, CEOs (owners of 
the business in most cases) can hide personal income to lose less wealth given the division of 
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property after divorce by law7. Nevertheless, this argument is implausible. Sophisticated CEOs 
have more incentive to manipulate earnings in the years before the divorce year rather than the 
years after. However, Table 6 clearly presents that before the divorce year, divorce firms do not 
perform significantly differently compared with either matched non-divorce firms or all non-
divorce firms. Neither difference in industry-adjusted OROA/ROA between four years before 
divorce and two years before divorce [-4,-2] of divorce firms nor three years before divorce and 
one year before divorce [-3-1] of divorce firms is significantly different from that of matched 
non-divorce firms and all non-divorce firms. These findings demonstrate that divorce firms 
perform consistently similar to non-divorce firms. Hence, earning management has a slim chance 
to be the driving force of performance drop of divorce firms.   
5.5     Mechanisms of negative divorce effect on firm performance 

Thus far, I have verified that CEO divorce dampens firm performance. In this section, I aim to 
probing into underlying channels through which CEO divorce hits performance. Constrained by 
data availability, I am unable to explore all potential mechanisms explained in literature review. 
Instead, I focus on the following channels.
      First of all, a large body of psychological and sociological literature documents bitter and 
enduring marital conflict between divorce couple. And the chances are that this conflict persists 
for years after divorce (e.g. Hopper, 2001; Arendell, 1986; Dillon and Emery, 1996; Johnston 
and Campbell, 1993). Although marital conflict takes a series of related but different phenomena 
(verbal fights, name calling, hatred, physical threats and violence, non-cooperation with court 
orders, custody battles, property disputes, burglaries, etc.) in divorce (Straus, 1979) and all forms 

7 The related Danish divorce laws stipulate the division of property between the divorcing couple. 
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of conflict may bring costs to a CEO and further his firm given the intertwinement of family and 
business, I define marital conflict, in my setting, as difference (or conflict) in interests and non-
cooperation or antagonism between divorce couple in terms of firm operation. The microscope is 
directed to the boardroom, where conflict of interests or non-cooperation from different board 
members is most likely to damage firm performance. For example, when a firm is voting for 
distribution of remaining earnings, conflict between board members may force the investment to 
be passed by. Suppose a CEO’s spouse board member will divorce the CEO in the future. He 
may urge to distribute the earnings to shareholders as dividends, knowing that he will be 
unseated from the board and have no stake in the firm after divorce with division of property, 
while the CEO wants the remaining earnings to be re-invested in the new project, focusing on 
sustainability of the firm. As a result, he might veto the project, either by colluding with the other 
members of the board or by himself. In other words, the CEO and his to-be-divorced spouse 
board member have disparate commitments to firm development.  This leads to efficiency loss. 
Alternative, I may interpret this conflict as asset expropriation or rent seeking from a self-
interested spouse board member in a shortly-cracked partnership. 
      I focus on divorce firms, and use dummy joint-management of CEO couple in the board as a 
proxy for marital conflict, which will impinge on firm performance. The reason for only using 
divorce firms is that those non-divorce firms may also have marital conflict between the couple 
but they just do not get divorced for whatever grounds (e.g. to maintain family honor). Therefore, 
using both non-divorce firms and divorce firms may gives rise to measurement errors. Divorce 
firms, by contrast, must have marital conflict and joint-management provides the platform for 
conflict to enduringly strike firm operation. 
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      I hypothesize that joint-management of divorce couple during 5 year divorce window is 
negatively correlated to firm performance. Again, a fixed effect estimator is used to investigate 
the effect. Table 9 evidences my hypothesis.  
[Insert Table 9] 
      Controlling for firm size, profitability and capital structure, time fixed effect and firm fixed 
effect, I show that joint-management exacerbates industry-adjusted OROA by 7 percent, while  
industry-adjusted ROA by 5 percent relative to non-joint-managed period. Although coefficients 
only account for those firms with variations in joint-management status and other forms of 
conflict between the divorce couples may not be fully captured in the dummy, the results still 
provide some evidence to explain one mechanism of CEO divorce shock on firm performance.  
      One big change after divorce is the fall of personal economic status due to division of 
property. Bearing in mind that most of the sample firms are family firms with fuzzy boundary 
between personal funds and firm funds, one may expect that decrease in collateral caused by 
division of property will lead to credit constraints. Divorce firms will get less access to loans. 
Loans are traditionally important financing resource of Danish firms (Ampenberger, Bennedsen 
and Zhou, 2011). Firms after CEO divorces may have financial structure change, which is 
correlated to performance variation.  
      I make the same univariate DID analysis as before to investigate this possible mechanism in 
Table 10.  Besides debt ratio as the key indicator, I also involve short term debt (Ln shortdebt), 
firm size (Ln asset) and fixed asset (Ln fixasset) for robustness tests. Whether I utilize all non-
divorce firms or matched non-divorce firms as control, there is no significant difference between 
divorce firms and either of the control samples in terms of capital structure change across 
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divorce years at 10 percent level. Similarly, short term debt, firm size, and fixed assets of divorce 
firms do not display significant difference across divorce year compared with all non-divorce 
firms and matched non-divorce firms. Notice that Table 1 shows that divorce firms are not 
significantly different from non-divorce firms in terms of size and capital structure, which means 
divorce firms are not smaller and more leveraged firms. The non-significance results of DID 
analyses suggest that divorce firms, like non-divorce firms, are professionally managed with 
similar firm characteristics and ambiguity of personal and corporate fund fails to prevail in those 
divorce firms. 
[Insert Table 10] 
      To sum up, change in capital structure, fixed assets, and firm size is unable to explain 
underperformance of divorce firms relative to non-divorce firms. Marital conflict proxied by the 
joint-management of divorcing couple has some explanatory power of performance drop of CEO 
divorce firms.
6 Discussion
Over the years, the adoption of unilateral divorce law or other policy changes facilitating divorce 
evokes stiff debates both in U.S. (e.g. Stevensen and Wolfers, 2006) and in Europe (for instance, 
Piketty, 2003). Many people attribute the swift growth in divorce rate to unilateral divorce law 
and point the finger to the easy access to divorce, which decays traditional family structure. 
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However, some economists evidence that women do benefit from unilateral divorce law in the 
sense that domestic violence are suppressed (Stevensen and Wolfers, 2006).
      This paper brings a new perspective to the debate8. Top managers’ divorce is socially costly 
in the form of exacerbation of firm performance. If marital conflict is one of the mechanism 
channels of efficiency loss in the interval of divorce period and the divorce couple is desperate to 
get apart, provisions or public policies, designed to rapidly terminate an antagonistic marriage, 
may play a role of decongesting marital conflict and further benefiting both the couple and the 
firms they head. From this point of view, unilateral divorce can mitigate the magnitude of 
negative effect of marital conflict on firms helmed by divorce couples.   
      My findings may also carry some implications for corporate governance code or corporate 
law. Couple joint-management is likely to undermine corporate performance when divorce 
occurs to the couple. In an economy like Denmark, where family firms are the backbone, joint-
management of a couple is popular. Therefore, the potential cost of joint-management can be 
high to the economy with the climbing divorce rate.  
      Family business researchers argue that altruism and nepotism are the main reasons for family 
control and family succession and they may plague firm value in some cases. My empirical study 
sheds light on the costs of nepotism in the case of family firms controlled by a couple who will 
get divorced.
      To the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence in literature supporting couple 
synergies of joint-management. Thus, my results may give some suggestive guidance for good 

8 I notice that my results come from a relatively small economy and may not be applicable to other bigger economies, especially 
Anglo-Saxon countries like the US and the UK. However, my research still contributes to the debate of unilateral divorce from a
novel and broader perspective, introducing economic consequence of divorce on an organizational level.  
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corporate governance practice in respect of board composition. Couple presence at the corporate 
board may not be optimal.   
      I am fully aware that all the findings in this paper are from Denmark. These findings may not 
be applicable to other bigger economies like the US and the UK with different institutional 
background.  The real effect of CEO divorce on firm performance in those economies remains 
unknown to us. Future research can be directed to investigate whether the similar effect exists in 
the context of the US and the UK.
7 Concluding remarks 
The last decades witness rise in divorce rates in most industrialized countries. Academics pay 
increasing attention to divorce researches. A large amount of economic and sociological 
literature focuses on economic and well-being consequence of divorce on divorcing couples and 
children. However, little literature touches on consequence of divorce at a broader organizational 
level. Lack of knowledge in this field motivates this study.  
      I focus on CEOs, the key figures in corporate organizations, and scrutinize the ex-post 
economic consequence of CEO divorce on the firms they head. Using an informative Danish 
private firm dataset, I find that firms after CEO divorce underperform, both relative to previous 
performance and relative to matched non-divorce firms as well as all non-divorce firms. 
      Tense, antagonistic, and non-corporative relationship between divorcing couple looms large 
around divorce year. Difference in interests arises because of divergent commitments to the same 
firm given one party will leave the business after breaking up. My empirical results suggest that 
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CEO divorce hits firm performance partly through the channel of antagonism and difference in 
interests of divorcing couple.
      The empirical results show that joint-management of the divorcing couple jeopardizes firm 
performance. I suggest that while no empirical evidence supports the advantages of couple 
presence at the corporate board, my paper draws attention to potential costs of couple presence. 
It may not be optimal to have a couple simultaneously present at the corporate board.
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Figure 1 Divorce rates in OECD countries 
Notes:  
1. Data refer to 2005 for EU countries except Germany and France and to 2006 for Germany, France, Iceland, 
New Zealand, Turkey and the US. 
2. Data source: OECD, www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database 
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
Panel B. Industry and Region Distributions of divorce firms, mathced non-divorce firms and all non-divorce firms
 All non-
divorce
firms
Matched 
non-
divorce
firms
Divorce  
firms
  Difference in distribution (p-value) 
    All-divorce Matched-divorce 
Region distribution (%) 
Capital region of Denmark 28.39 38.11 39.34 
Region Zealand 11.98 11.07 10.66 
South Denmark region 23.24 19.26 17.62 0.000 *** 0.967 
Central Denmark region 25.57 22.13 22.54 
North Denmark Region 10.81 9.43 9.84 
Industry distribution9 (%) 
Agriculture, fishing, quarrying   2.87 0.41 1.23 
Manufacturing   8.30 9.84 10.25 
Electricity, gas and water supply   0.60 0 0 
Construction   11.22 9.84 11.48 
0.000 *** 0.852 
Ws. and retail trade; hotels, restaurants   17.59 19.67 20.08 
Transport, post and 
telecommunications   3.24 2.46 2.05 
Finance and business activities   51.10 50.82 48.77 
Public and personal services   5.07 6.97 6.15         
Notes: 
1. The sample includes all firms in all calendar years in which a firm’s CEO gets divorced. 
2. I apply a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimator to obtain matched non-divorce firms. 
3. First marriage age is the age of CEO when he gets married for the 1st time. CEO male is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if the firm’s CEO is male and zero otherwise. CEO age is the CEO’s age in a certain 
calendar year. Ln asset is firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets measured in 
one thousand Danish Kroner. Profitability is defined as a firm’s industry-adjusted OROA in the year prior 
to the calendar year. Debt ratio is capital structure, defined as the ratio of book debt to total asset. Joint-
managed is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm’s CEO and his/her spouse are 
simultaneously present in either managerial board or supervisory board in the year or zero otherwise. Age 
difference is the age difference between CEO and his/her spouse. CEO tenure is the difference between a 
calendar year and the year when the CEO first works in the firm. Parent divorce is a dummy variable which 
is equal to one if the CEO has divorced parents and zero otherwise. ROA is returns on Assets, defined as 
net income over the book value of total assets. OROA is Operating Retunes on Assets, defined as the ratio 
of earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) to the book values of assets. Industry adj ROA is industry 
adjusted Returns on Assets, defined as returns on assets minus the industry ROA means and industry ROA 
means are arithmetic averages of all the registered firms' yearly ROA in KOB dataset. I classify different 
industry in light of the Danish Industrial Classification 200310.Industry adj OROA is industry adjusted 
Operating Returns on Assets, defined as operating returns on assets minus the industry OROA means, and 
industry OROA means are arithmetic averages of all the registered firms' yearly OROA in KOB dataset. 
Like that in ROA, I classify different industry in light of the Danish Industrial Classification 2003. Ln 
fixasset is firm’s fixed asset, defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's fixed assets measured in one 
thousand Danish Kroner. Ln shortdebt is Firm’s short term debt, defined as the natural logarithm of the 
firm's current liability with maturity less than one year, measured in one thousand Danish Kroner. 
4. ***, **, and * refer to significance level of 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
5. Data sources: Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB), Erhvervs-og Selskab-sstyrelsen (E&S) and the 
official Danish Civil Registration System. 

9 I use 2-digit coding from Danish Industrial Classification 2003 to identify 8 industries. Danish Industrial 
Classification 2003 is based on NACE (Nomenclature generale des Activitiés économique dans les Communautes 
Européennes) prepared by the EU in 1970. 
10Here I use 4-digit coding from Danish Industrial Classification 2003 to identify 27 different industry groups and 
calculate industry ROA and OROA means year by year.
154 

Table 2 Determinants of CEO Divorce 
 Dependent variable 
 Dummy: divorce 
CEO age -0.014 ** 
(0.006)
First marriage age 0.003
(0.010)
CEO male 0.408
(0.314)
Profitability 0.249
(0.323)
Ln asset 0.024
(0.032)
Debt ratio 0.030
(0.199)
_cons -5.496
(0.617)
Industry dummy Yes
Region dummy Yes
R-sqaured 0.033
N 8403 
Notes:
1. This table reports the determinants of CEO divorce in 2003.  
2. The dependent variable is dummy Divorce which equals one if the CEO of a firm gets divorced in 2003. 
CEO age is the CEO’s age in 2003. First marriage age is the age of CEO when he gets married for the 1st
time. CEO male is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm’s CEO is male and zero otherwise. 
Ln asset is firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets measured in one thousand 
Danish Kroner in 2003. Profitability is defined as a firm’s industry-adjusted OROA in 2002. Debt ratio is 
capital structure, defined as the ratio of book debt to total asset in 2003. 
3. ***, **, and * refer to significance level of 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
4. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
5. Data source: Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB) database, Erhvervs-og Selskab-sstyrelsen (E&S) 
and the official Danish Civil Registration System. 
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Figure 2 Industry-adjusted ROA and OROA evolution around divorce year 
Notes:  
1. This Figure shows firm performance evolution during 5 year divorce window centered by divorce year. 
2. I apply a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimator to obtain matched non-divorced firms. 
3. Industry adj ROA is industry adjusted Returns on Assets, defined as returns on assets minus the industry 
ROA means and industry ROA means are arithmetic averages of all the registered firms' yearly ROA in 
KOB dataset. I classify different industry in light of the Danish Industrial Classification 2003. Industry adj 
OROA is industry adjusted Operating Returns on Assets, defined as operating returns on assets minus the 
industry OROA means, and industry OROA means are arithmetic averages of all the registered firms' 
yearly OROA in KOB dataset. Like that in ROA, I classify different industry in light of the Danish 
Industrial Classification 2003. 
4. Data source: Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB) database, Erhvervs-og Selskab-sstyrelsen (E&S) 
and the official Danish Civil Registration System.
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Table 6 Difference in difference analysis of pre-divorce performance 
All non-
divorce 
firms 
Matched 
non-divorce 
firms 
Divorce 
firms 
Difference in mean  
Matched- 
divorce All-divorce 
Difference in Industry adj OROA -0.008 0.019 -0.012 0.031 0.004 
[-2,0] (0.001) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) 
[38707] [244] [244]
Difference in Industry adj OROA -0.004 0.022 0.007 0.014 -0.011 
[-1,0] (0.001) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) 
[38707] [244] [244]
Difference in Industry adj OROA -0.005 -0.003 -0.020 0.016 0.015 
[-2,-1] (0.001) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) 
[38706] [244] [244]
Difference in Industry adj OROA -0.007 -0.012 -0.016 0.003 0.009 
[-4,-2] (0.001) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) 
[19368] [99] [102] 
Difference in Industry adj OROA -0.007 -0.002 -0.023 0.021 0.016 
[-3,-1] (0.001) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) 
[28994] [164] [170] 
Difference in Industry adj ROA -0.007 0.017 -0.008 0.025 0.001 
[-2,0] (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) 
[38708] [244] [244]
Difference in Industry adj ROA -0.003 0.020 0.005 0.016 -0.008 
[-1,0] (0.001) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) 
[38708] [244] [244]
Difference in Industry adj ROA -0.004 -0.003 -0.013 0.010 0.009 
[-2,-1] (0.001) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) 
[38708] [244] [244]
Difference in Industry adj ROA -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 0.000 
[-4,-2] (0.001) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) 
[19369] [99] [102] 
Difference in Industry adj ROA -0.006 -0.004 -0.016 0.012 0.010 
[-3,-1] (0.001) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) 
 [28996] [164] [170]    
Notes: 
1. This table reports the performance change of firms before divorce year.  
2. I apply a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimator to obtain matched non-divorced firms. 
3. Difference in industry adj OROA (ROA) is performance change in industry adj OROA (ROA) between two 
years indicated in brackets. Year 0 means divorce year. For example, difference in industry adj OROA [-2, 
0] means industry-adjusted OROA difference between two years before divorce and divorce year.  Industry 
adj OROA is defined as operating returns on assets minus the industry OROA means, and industry OROA 
means are arithmetic averages of all the registered firms' yearly OROA in KOB dataset. I classify different 
industry in light of the Danish Industrial Classification 2003. Industry adj ROA is defined as returns on 
assets minus the industry ROA means and industry ROA means are arithmetic averages of all the registered 
firms' yearly ROA in KOB dataset. I classify different industry in light of the Danish Industrial 
Classification 2003. 
4. ***, **, and * refer to significance level of 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
5. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
6. Observation numbers are reported in brackets. 
7. Data source: Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB) database, Erhvervs-og Selskab-sstyrelsen (E&S) 
and the official Danish Civil Registration System. 
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Table 7 Divorce effect on firm performance (alternative matching variables) 
Dependent variable: Difference in Industry-adjusted Operating Return on Assets (OROA) 
(two-year mean after divorce year minus two-year mean before divorce year)  
Alternative matching variables (set 1) Alternative matching variables (set 2) 
Divorce -0.028 ** -0.029 ** -0.035 ** -0.034 ** 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
CEO male -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO age 0.081 * 0.087 * -0.004 -0.009 
(0.043) (0.048) (0.034) (0.033) 
Profitability -0.379 *** -0.375 *** -0.441 *** -0.439 *** 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Ln asset -0.009 * -0.010 * -0.007 -0.010 * 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Debt ratio 0.076 *** 0.074 *** 0.011 0.013 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
_cons 0.011 -0.057 0.097 -0.016 
(0.064) (0.075) (0.067) (0.074) 
Year dummy No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.202 0.217 0.228 0.250 
N 477  477  488  488 
Notes: 
1. The sample includes all the divorce firms and matched non-divorce firms during 5 year divorce 
window centered by divorce year, using alternative matching variables.  
2. Dependent variable is two-year mean after divorce year minus two-year mean before divorce year of 
industry adjusted OROA, defined as operating returns on assets minus the industry OROA means, and 
industry OROA means are arithmetic averages of all the registered firms' yearly OROA in KOB 
dataset. I classify different industry in light of the Danish Industrial Classification 2003. Divorce is a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm’s CEO experiences a divorce and zero otherwise. 
CEO male is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm’s CEO is male and zero otherwise. 
CEO age is the CEO’s age in a certain calendar year. Ln asset is firm size, defined as the natural 
logarithm of the firm's total assets measured in one thousand Danish Kroner. Profitability is defined as 
a firm’s industry-adjusted OROA last year. Debt ratio is capital structure, defined as the ratio of book 
debt to total asset. 
3. In the first 2 columns, I apply a one-to-one nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimator to 
obtain one matched non-divorce firm for each divorce firm. The matching variables are CEO age, CEO 
male, first marriage age, firm size, Ln fixasset Ln shortdebt, industry dummy and region dummy. In 
the last 2 columns, I apply a one-to-five nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimator to 
obtain one matched non-divorce firms for each divorce firm. The matching variables are CEO age, 
joint-management, firm size, profitability, debt ratio, industry dummy and region dummy.  
4. ***, **, and * refer to significance level of 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
5. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
6. Data source: Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB) database, Erhvervs-og Selskab-sstyrelsen
(E&S) and the official Danish Civil Registration System. 
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Table 9 Marital conflict and firm performance 
  Dependent Variable  
Industry adj ROA Industry adj OROA 
Joint-managed -0.050 ** -0.069 ** 
(0.020) (0.027)
Ln asset 0.035 0.039
(0.023) (0.029)
Debt ratio -0.524 *** -0.610 *** 
(0.065) (0.082)
Ln fixasset -0.013 * -0.016
(0.008) (0.010)
Ln shortdebt 0.056 *** 0.068 *** 
(0.015) (0.018)
_cons -0.105 -0.091
(0.117) (0.149)
Year dummy Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.188 0.168
N 237    237 
Notes: 
1. The sample only includes divorce firms during 5 year divorce window centered by divorce year. 
2. In the 1st column, dependent variable is industry adjusted OROA, defined as operating returns on assets 
minus the industry OROA means, and industry OROA means are arithmetic averages of all the registered 
firms' yearly OROA in KOB dataset. I classify different industry in light of the Danish Industrial 
Classification 2003. In the 2nd column, dependent variable is industry adj ROA is industry adjusted Returns 
on Assets, defined as returns on assets minus the industry ROA means and industry ROA means are 
arithmetic averages of all the registered firms' yearly ROA in KOB dataset. I classify different industry in 
light of the Danish Industrial Classification 2003. Joint-managed is a dummy variable which is equal to one 
if the firm’s CEO and his/her spouse are simultaneously present in either managerial board or supervisory 
board in the year or zero otherwise. Ln asset is firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's total 
assets measured in one thousand Danish Kroner. Debt ratio is capital structure, defined as the ratio of book 
debt to total asset. Ln fixasset is firm’s fixed asset, defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's fixed assets 
measured in one thousand Danish Kroner. Ln shortdebt is Firm’s short term debt, defined as the natural 
logarithm of the firm's current liability with maturity less than one year, measured in one thousand Danish 
Kroner 
3. ***, **, and * refer to significance level of 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
4. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
5. Data source: Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB) database, Erhvervs-og Selskab-sstyrelsen (E&S) 
and the official Danish Civil Registration System. 
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Table 10 Difference in difference analysis of capital structure, short term debt, total assets and fixed 
assets around divorce years 
All non-
divorce
firms
Matched 
non-divorce
firms
Divorce
firms
Difference in mean  
Matched- 
divorce 
All-
divorce 
Difference in debt ratio -0.028 -0.023 -0.020 -0.003 -0.008
(Two year after- two year before) (0.180) (0.174) (0.195) (0.017) (0.012)
[38708] [244] [244]
Difference in Ln asset 0.201 0.249 0.180 0.069 0.021
(Two year after- two year before) (0.577) (0.544) (0.627) (0.053) (0.037)
[38708] [244] [244]
Difference in Ln shortdebt 0.130 0.263 0.147 0.117 -0.016
(Two year after- two year before) (0.980) (0.903) (1.024) (0.087) (0.063)
[38630] [244] [243]
Difference in Ln fixasset 0.051 0.102 0.009 0.093 0.042
(Two year after- two year before) (0.881) (0.825) (0.988) (0.086) (0.059)
  [34579] [223] [223]        
Notes: 
1. The sample includes all firm observations during 5 year window centered by divorce year. 
2. I apply a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimator to obtain matched non-divorced firms. 
3. Ln asset is firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets measured in one thousand 
Danish Kroner. Debt ratio is capital structure, defined as the ratio of book debt to total asset. Ln fixasset is 
firm’s fixed asset, defined as the defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's fixed assets measured in one 
thousand Danish Kroner. Ln shortdebt is Firm’s short term debt, defined as the natural logarithm of the 
firm's current liability with maturity less than one year, measured in one thousand Danish Kroner. 
Difference in debt ratio, Ln asset, Ln shortdebt, and Ln fixasset is two year mean after divorce year minus 
two year mean before divorce year of debt ratio, Ln asset, Ln shortdebt, and Ln fixasset respectively. 
4. ***, **, and * refer to significance level of 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
5. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
6. Observation numbers are reported in brackets. 
7. Data source: Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB) database, Erhvervs-og Selskab-sstyrelsen (E&S) 
and the official Danish Civil Registration System. 
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Appendix 1 Sample size of divorce firms and non-divorce firms between 1996 through 2004 
Notes: 
1. This figure reports sample size of CEO divorce firms and non-divorce firms in all divorce years in which a 
firm’s CEO gets divorced.   
2. Data source: Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB) database, Erhvervs-og Selskab-sstyrelsen (E&S) 
and the official Danish Civil Registration System. 
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Appendix 2 Comparison of interactions of major matching variables between matched non-
divorce firms and divorce firms 
Matched non-
divorce firms Divorce firms Difference 
First marriage age* CEO male 27.738 27.156 0.582 
(8.192) (8.028) (0.734) 
[244] [244] 
First marriage age* CEO age 1297.295 1282.832 14.463 
(332.761) (348.456) (30.845) 
[244] [244] 
First marriage age*Ln asset 231.057 229.451 1.606 
(55.634) (62.881) (5.375) 
[244] [244] 
First marriage age*Profitability 0.510 0.664 -0.154 
(4.864) (4.980) (0.446) 
[244] [244] 
First marriage age*Debt ratio 16.217 16.088 0.129 
(9.127) (9.171) (0.828) 
[244] [244] 
CEO male*CEO age 0.543 0.540 0.003 
(0.312) (0.315) (0.028) 
[244] [244] 
CEO male*Ln asset 7.715 7.702 0.013 
(1.989) (2.111) (0.186) 
[244] [244] 
CEO male*Profitability 0.022 0.020 0.002 
(0.164) (0.165) (0.015) 
[244] [244] 
CEO male*Debt ratio 43.594 43.074 0.520 
(12.494) (12.262) (1.121) 
[244] [244] 
CEO age*Ln asset 365.306 364.254 1.052 
(94.275) (95.767) (8.603) 
[244] [244] 
CEO age*Profitability 0.727 0.958 -0.231 
(7.738) (7.611) (0.695) 
[244] [244] 
CEO age*Debt ratio 25.415 25.154 0.261 
(14.366) (13.838) (1.277) 
[244] [244] 
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(Appendix 2,continuous) 
Ln asset*Profitability 0.154 0.182 -0.028 
[244] [244] 
Ln asset*Debt ratio 4.616 4.613 0.003 
(2.575) (2.630) (0.236) 
[244] [244] 
Profitability*Debt ratio -0.004 0.001 -0.005 
(0.106) (0.101) (0.009) 
  [244] [244] 
Notes:
1. The sample includes all firm observations during 5 year window centered by divorce year. 
2. I apply a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimator to obtain matched non-divorce firms. 
3. First marriage age is the age of CEO when he gets married for the 1st time. CEO male is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if the firm’s CEO is male and zero otherwise. CEO age is the CEO’s age in a certain 
calendar year. Ln asset is firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets measured in 
one thousand Danish Kroner. Profitability is defined as a firm’s industry-adjusted OROA last year. Debt 
ratio is capital structure, defined as the ratio of book debt to total asset.  
4. ***, **, and * refer to significance level of 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
5. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
6. Observation numbers are reported in brackets. 
7. Data source: Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB) database, Erhvervs-og Selskab-sstyrelsen (E&S) 
and the official Danish Civil Registration System. 
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Conclusions
The dissertation empirically examines corporate performance and capital structure of family 
firms.  
      The first chapter deals with the capital structure of family firms with a focus on the debt-
equity mix. The chapter consists of a literature review and an empirical analysis. In the review, 
we point out that risk aversion, agency theory, and control considerations serve as the most 
important theories to explain the capital structure of family firms. While risk aversion of the 
controlling families makes family firms less leveraged, control considerations have an opposite 
impact. The literature review also shows that evidence on capital structure of family firms is 
inconclusive. Large-scale evidence on private family firms is almost missing.  
      In the empirical analysis, we examine the debt leverage of family firms, using an informative 
dataset covering around 200,000 private and public Danish firms. We find that family firms are 
less leveraged than non-family firms. The findings are consistent across all types of family firms 
we define. Whereas small firms have the lowest leverage, entrepreneurial firms have the highest. 
We conclude that several features of family firms, such as risk aversion and control 
considerations, rather than differences in other firm-specific characteristics account for the lower 
levels of leverage in family firms.  
       The second chapter provides new evidence examining whether family firms are superior 
performers under the background of current global financial crisis. Using a dataset covering 
firms from S&P 500 (US), FTSE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France), and FTSE 
MIB 40 (Italy) during the period of 2006-2010, I find that family firms outperform non-family 
firms in OROA only when the founder is CEO, a board member or a significant blockholder. By 
contrast, Tobin’s Q and risk-adjusted Alpha of founder firms do not differ from those of the 
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other firms. I argue that the attenuation of the market value premium of founder firms is 
ascribable to high volatility of stock prices and investors’ overreaction during the crisis 
(Veronesi, 1999; Glode et al., 2010). I also find that founder firms invest less and have better 
access to the credit market during the crisis. The findings suggest that the superior performance 
of founder firms is largely caused by less incentive to invest in risky projects with a high 
likelihood of failure in order to boost earnings during the crisis. Furthermore, the findings also 
suggest that founder firms bear the least agency costs, and that Tobin’s Q and Alpha may not be 
the most appropriate measures of corporate performance during the financial crisis. 
      The third chapter estimates the economic consequence of a family event— CEO divorce on 
the firm performance. The chapter shows that divorce has a significant negative effect on 
economic outcome of an organization, in addition to its widely-documented impact on 
individuals. Using the same dataset in the first chapter, which covers almost all Danish private 
firms and CEO personal and family information (like CEO’s marriage history), I find that firms 
subsequently underperform after CEO divorce, both relative to previous performance and 
relative to non-divorce firms. The negative effect of divorce is consistent whether I adopt all 
non-divorce firms or matched non-divorce firms as control. Further research shows that marital 
conflict between the divorcing couple acts as one channel through which divorce hits firm 
performance.  
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